[Footnote 344:  “Commentaries on the War in Russia and Germany,” p. 195.]

[Footnote 345:  In his letters of August 16th to Macdonald and Ney he assumed that the allies might strike at Dresden, or even as far west as Zwickau:  but meanwhile he would march “pour enlever Bluecher.”]

[Footnote 346:  “Lettres inedites de Napoleon.”  The Emperor forwarded this suggestion to Savary (August 11th):  it doubtless meant an issue of false paper notes, such as had been circulated in Russia the year before.]

[Footnote 347:  Cathcart, “Commentaries,” p. 206.]

[Footnote 348:  “Extrait d’un Memoire sur la Campagne de 1813.”  With characteristic inaccuracy Marbot remarks that the defection of Jomini, with Napoleon’s plans, was “a disastrous blow.”  The same is said by Dedem de Gelder, p. 328.]

[Footnote 349:  The Emperor’s eagerness is seen by the fact that on August 21st he began dictating despatches, at Lauban, at 3 a.m.  On the previous day he had dictated seventeen despatches; twelve at Zittau, four after his ride to Goerlitz, and one more on his arrival at Lauban at midnight.]

[Footnote 350:  Letters of August 23rd to Berthier.]

[Footnote 351:  Boyen, vol. iii., p. 85.  But see Wiehr, “Nap. und Bernadotte in 1813,” who proves how risky was B.’s position, with the Oder fortresses, held by the French, on one flank, and Davoust and the Danes on the other.  He disposes of many of the German slanders against Bernadotte.]

[Footnote 352:  Hausser, pp. 260-267.  Oudinot’s “Memoirs” throw the blame on the slowness of Bertrand in effecting the concentration on Grossbeeren and on the heedless impetuosity of Reynier.  Wiehr (pp. 74-116) proves from despatches that Bernadotte meant to attack the French south of Berlin:  he discredits the “bones” anecdote.]

[Footnote 353:  Letters of August 23rd.]

[Footnote 354:  So called to distinguish it from the two other Neisses in Silesia.]

[Footnote 355:  Blasendorfs “Bluecher”; Mueffling’s “Aus meinem Leben” and “Campaigns of the Silesian Army in 1813 and 1814”; Bertin’s “La Campagne de 1813.”  Hausser assigns to the French close on 60,000 at the battle; to the allies about 70,000.]

[Footnote 356:  Jomini, “Vie de Napoleon,” vol. iv., p. 380; “Toll,” vol. iii., p. 124.]

[Footnote 357:  “Toll,” vol. iii., p. 144.  Cathcart reports (p. 216) that Moreau remarked to him:  “We are already on Napoleon’s communications; the possession of the town [Dresden] is no object; it will fall of itself at a future time.”  If Moreau said this seriously it can only be called a piece of imbecility.  The allies were far from safe until they had wrested from Napoleon one of his strong places on the Elbe; it was certainly not enough to have seized Pirna.]

[Footnote 358:  “Corresp.”  No. 20461.]

[Footnote 359:  Cathcart’s “Commentaries,” p. 230:  Bertin, “La Campagne de 1813,” p. 109; Marmont, “Mems.,” bk. xvii.; Sir Evelyn Wood’s “Achievements of Cavalry.”]