[Footnote 334:  Thiers; Ernouf’s “Maret, Duc de Bassano,” p. 571.]

[Footnote 335:  Bignon “Hist. de France,” vol. xii., p. 199; Lefebvre, “Cabinets de l’Europe,” vol. v., p. 555.]

[Footnote 336:  Letter of July 29th.]

[Footnote 337:  Gentz to Sir G. Jackson, August 4th ("Bath Archives,” vol. ii., p. 199).  For a version flattering to Napoleon, see Ernouf’s “Maret” (pp. 579-587), which certainly exculpates the Minister.]

[Footnote 338:  Metternich, “Memoirs,” vol. ii., p. 546 (Eng. ed.).]

[Footnote 339:  “F.O.,” Russia, No. 86.  A letter of General Nugent (July 27th), from Prague, is inclosed.  When he (N.) expressed to Metternich the fear that Caulaincourt’s arrival there portended peace, M. replied that this would make no alteration, “as the proposals were such that they certainly would not be accepted, and they would even be augmented.”]

[Footnote 340:  “Souvenirs du Duc de Broglie,” vol. i., ch. v.]

[Footnote 341:  British aims at this time are well set forth in the instructions and the accompanying note to Lord Aberdeen, our ambassador designate at Vienna, dated Foreign Office, August 6th, 1813:  " ...  Your Lordship will collect from these instructions that a general peace, in order to provide adequately for the tranquillity and independence of Europe, ought, in the judgment of His Majesty’s Government, to confine France at least within the Pyrenees, the Alps, and the Rhine:  and if the other Great Powers of Europe should feel themselves enabled to contend for such a Peace, Great Britain is fully prepared to concur with them in such a line of policy.  If, however, the Powers most immediately concerned should determine, rather than encounter the risks of a more protracted struggle, to trust for their own security to a more imperfect arrangement, it never has been the policy of the British Government to attempt to dictate to other States a perseverance in war, which they did not themselves recognize to be essential to their own as well as to the common safety.”  As regards details, we desired to see the restoration of Venetia to Austria, of the Papal States to the Pope, of the north-west of Italy to the King of Sardinia, but trusted that “a liberal establishment” might be found for Murat in the centre of Italy.  Napoleon knew that we desired to limit France to the “natural frontiers” and that we were resolved to insist on our maritime claims.  As our Government took this unpopular line, and went further than Austria in its plans for restricting French influence, he had an excellent opportunity for separating the Continental Powers from us.  But he gave out that those Powers were bought by England, and that we were bent on humiliating France.]

[Footnote 342:  Boyen, “Erinnerungen,” Pt.  III., p. 66.]

[Footnote 343:  Fain, vol. ii., p. 27.  The italicized words are given thus by him; but they read like a later excuse for Napoleon’s failures.]