[Footnote 259:  “Toll,” vol. i., pp. 256 et seq. Mueffling was assured by Phull in 1819 that the Drissa plan was only part of a grander design which had never had a fair[Scanner’s note:  fair is correct] chance!]

[Footnote 260:  Bernhardi’s “Toll” (vol. i., p. 231) gives Barclay’s chief “army of the west” as really mustering only 127,000 strong, along with 9,000 Cossacks; Bagration, with the second “army of the west,” numbered at first only 35,000, with 4,000 Cossacks; while Tormasov’s corps observing Galicia was about as strong.  Clausewitz gives rather higher estimates.]

[Footnote 261:  Labaume, “Narrative of 1812,” and Segur.]

[Footnote 262:  See the long letter of May 28th, 1812, to De Pradt; also the Duc de Broglie’s “Memoirs” (vol. i., ch. iv.) for the hollowness of Napoleon’s Polish policy.  Bignon, “Souvenirs d’un Diplomate” (ch. xx.), errs in saying that Napoleon charged De Pradt—­“Tout agiter, tout enflammer.”  At St. Helena, Napoleon said to Montholon ("Captivity,” vol. iii., ch. iii.):  “Poland and its resources were but poetry in the first months of the year 1812.”]

[Footnote 263:  “Toll,” vol. i., p. 239; Wilson, “Invasion of Russia,” p. 384.]

[Footnote 264:  We may here also clear aside the statements of some writers who aver that Napoleon intended to strike at St. Petersburg.  Perhaps he did so for a time.  On July 9th he wrote at Vilna that he proposed to march both on Moscow and St. Petersburg.  But that was while he still hoped that Davoust would entrap Bagration, and while Barclay’s retreat on Drissa seemed likely to carry the war into the north.  Napoleon always aimed first at the enemy’s army; and Barclay’s retreat from Drissa to Vitepsk, and thence to Smolensk, finally decided Napoleon’s move towards Moscow.  If he had any preconceived scheme—­and he always regulated his moves by events rather than by a cast-iron plan—­it was to strike at Moscow.  At Dresden he said to De Pradt:  “I must finish the war by the end of September....  I am going to Moscow:  one or two battles will settle the business.  I will burn Tula, and Russia will be at my feet.  Moscow is the heart of that Empire.  I will wage war with Polish blood.”  De Pradt’s evidence is not wholly to be trusted; but I am convinced that Napoleon never seriously thought of taking 200,000 men to the barren tracts of North Russia late in the summer, while the English, Swedish, and Russian fleets were ready to worry his flank and stop supplies.]

[Footnote 265:  Letter of August 24th to Maret; so too Labaume’s “Narrative,” and Garden, vol. xiii., p. 418.  Mr. George thinks that Napoleon decided on August 21st to strike at Moscow on grounds of general policy.]

[Footnote 266:  Labaume, “Narrative”; Lejeune’s “Mems.,” vol. ii., ch. vi.]

[Footnote 267:  Marbot’s “Mems.”  Bausset, a devoted servant to Napoleon, refutes the oft-told story that he was ill at Borodino.  He had nothing worse than a bad cold.  It is curious that such stories are told about Napoleon after every battle when his genius did not shine.  In this case, it rests on the frothy narrative of Segur, and is out of harmony with those of Gourgaud and Pelet.  Clausewitz justifies Napoleon’s caution in withholding his Guard.]