[Footnote 199:  So Soult told Lord Holland ("Foreign Reminiscences,” p. 171).]

[Footnote 200:  Vandal, vol. i., p. 384.]

[Footnote 201:  Metternich, “Mems.,” vol. ii. p. 298 (Eng. edit.).]

[Footnote 202:  I think that Beer (pp. 330-340) errs somewhat in ranking Talleyrand’s work at Erfurt at that statesman’s own very high valuation, which he enhanced in later years:  see Greville’s “Mems.,” Second Part, vol. ii., p. 193.]

[Footnote 203:  Vandal, vol. i., p. 307.]

[Footnote 204:  Sklower, “L’Entrevue de Napoleon avec Goethe”; Mrs. Austin’s “Germany from 1760 to 1814”; Oncken, bk. vii., ch. i.  For Napoleon’s dispute with Wieland about Tacitus see Talleyrand, “Mems.,” vol. i., pt. 5.  When the Emperors’ carriages were ready for departure, Talleyrand whispered to Alexander:  “Ah! si Votre Majeste pouvait se tromper de voiture.”]

[Footnote 205:  “F.O.,” Russia, No. 74, despatch of December 9th, 1808.  On January 14th, 1809, Canning signed a treaty of alliance with the Spanish people, both sides agreeing never to make peace with Napoleon except by common consent.  It was signed when the Spanish cause seemed desperate; but it was religiously observed.]

[Footnote 206:  Madelin’s “Fouche,” vol. ii., p. 80; Pasquier, vol. i., pp. 353-360.]

[Footnote 207:  Seeley, “Life and Times of Stein,” vol. ii., p. 316; Hausser, vol. iii., p. 219 (4th edition).]

[Footnote 208:  Our F.O.  Records show that we wanted to help Austria; but a long delay was caused by George III.’s insisting that she should make peace with us first.  Canning meanwhile sent L250,000 in silver bars to Trieste.  But in his note of April 20th he assured the Court of Vienna that our treasury had been “nearly exhausted” by the drain of the Peninsular War. (Austria, No. 90.)]

[Footnote 209:  For the campaign see the memoirs of Macdonald, Marbot, Lejeune, Pelet and Marmont.  The last (vol. iii., p. 216) says that, had the Austrians pressed home their final attacks at Aspern, a disaster was inevitable; or had Charles later on cut the French communications near Vienna, the same result must have followed.  But the investigations of military historians leave no doubt that the Austrian troops were too exhausted by their heroic exertions, and their supplies of ammunition too much depleted, to warrant any risky moves for several days; and by that time reinforcements had reached Napoleon.  See too Angelis’ “Der Erz-Herzog Karl.”]

[Footnote 210:  Thoumas, “Le Marechal Lannes,” pp. 205, 323 et seq. Desvernois ("Mems.,” ch. xii.) notes that after Austerlitz none of Napoleon’s wars had the approval of France.]

[Footnote 211:  For the Walcheren expedition see Alison, vol. viii.; James, vol. iv.; as also for Gambier’s failure at Rochefort.  The letters of Sir Byam Martin, then cruising off Danzig, show how our officers wished to give timely aid to Schill ("Navy Records,” vol. xii.).]