Napoleon paid little attention to the left wing of the allies.  The centre and right centre were evidently Wellington’s weak points, and there, especially near the transverse rise, our leader chiefly massed his troops.  Yet there, too, the defence had some advantages.  The front of the centre was protected by La Haye Sainte, “a strong stone and brick building,” says Cotton, “with a narrow orchard in front and a small garden in the rear, both of which were hedged around, except on the east side of the garden, where there was a strong wall running along the high-road.”  It is generally admitted that Wellington gave too little attention to this farm, which Napoleon saw to be the key of the allied position.  Loopholes were made in its south and east walls, but none in the western wall, and half of the barn-door opening on the fields had been torn off for firewood by soldiers overnight.  The place was held at first by 376 men of the King’s German Legion, who threw up a barricade at the barn-door, as also on the high-road outside the orchard; but, as the sappers and carpenters were removed to Hougoumont, little could be done.

Far stronger was the chateau of Hougoumont, which had been built with a view to defence.  The outbuildings were now loopholed, and scaffolds were erected to enable our men to fire over the garden walls which commanded the orchard.  The defence was intrusted to the light companies of the second battalions of Coldstreams and Foot Guards (now the Grenadier Guards); while the wood in front was held by Nassauers and Hanoverians.  Chasse’s Dutch-Belgians were posted at the village of Braine la Leud to give further security to Wellington’s right.[507] Napoleon’s intention was to pierce the allied centre behind La Haye Sainte, where their lines were thin.  But he did not know that behind the crest ran a sunken cross-road, which afforded excellent cover, and that the ground, sloping away towards Wellington’s rear, screened his second line and reserves.

It was this peculiarity of the ground, so different from that of the exposed slope behind Ligny, that helped the great master of defensive tactics secretly to meet and promptly to foil every onset of his mighty antagonist.

While under-estimating the strength of Wellington’s position Napoleon over-rated his numbers.  As we have seen, he remarked that the allies exceeded the French by more than a fourth.  Now, as his own numbers were fully 74,000, he credited the allies with upwards of 92,000.  In reality, they were not more than 67,000, as Wellington had left 17,000 at Hal; but if this powerful detachment had been included, Napoleon’s estimate would not have been far wrong.  At St. Helena he gave out that his despatch of cavalry towards Hal had induced Wellington to weaken his army to this extent; but Houssaye has shown that the statement is an entire fabrication.  The Emperor certainly believed that all Wellington’s troops were close at hand.[508]