The results of this prompt rally of the Prussians were infinitely enhanced by the fact that Wellington soon found it out, while Napoleon did not grasp its full import until he was in the thick of the battle of Waterloo.  To the final steps that led up to this dramatic finale we must now briefly refer.

It is strange that Gneisenau, on the night of the 16th, took no steps to warn his allies of the Prussian retreat, and merely left them to infer it from his last message, that he must do so if he were not succoured.  Mueffling, indeed, says that a Prussian officer was sent, but was shot by the French on the British left wing.  Seeing, however, that Wellington had beaten back Ney’s forces before the Prussian retreat began, the story may be dismissed as a lame excuse of Gneisenau’s neglect.[498]

From the risk of being crushed by Napoleon, the Anglo-Dutch forces were saved by the vigilance of their leader and the supineness of the enemy.  After a brief rest at Genappe, the Duke was back at the front at dawn, and despatched two cavalry patrols towards Sombref to find out the results of the battle.  The patrol, which was accompanied by the Duke’s aide-de-camp, Colonel Gordon, came into touch with the Prussian rear.  On his return soon after 10, the staff-officer, Basil Jackson, was at once sent to bid Picton immediately prepare to fall back on Waterloo, an order which that veteran received very sulkily.[499] Shortly after Gordon’s return, a Prussian orderly galloped up and confirmed the news of their retreat, which drew from the Duke the remark:  “Bluecher has had a d——­ d good licking and gone back to Wavre....  As he has gone back, we must go too.”  The infantry now began to file off by degrees behind hedges or under cover of a screen of cavalry and skirmishers, these keeping Ney’s men busy in front, until the bulk of the army was well through the narrow and crowded street of Genappe.

And how came it that Napoleon and Ney missed this golden opportunity?  In the first case, it was due to their chiefs of staff, who had not sent overnight any tidings as to the results of their respective battles.  Until Count Flahaut returned to the Imperial headquarters about 8 a.m., Napoleon knew nothing as to the position of affairs at Quatre Bras; while a similar carelessness on Soult’s part left Ney powerless to attempt anything against Wellington until somewhat later in the morning.

But Napoleon’s inaction lasted nearly up to 11.30.  How is this to be accounted for?  In reply, some attribute his conduct to illness of body and torpor of mind—­a topic that will engage our attention presently; others assert that the army urgently needed rest; but the effective cause was his belief that the Prussians were retreating eastwards away from Wellington.  This was the universal belief at headquarters.  He had ordered Grouchy to follow them at dawn; Grouchy’s lieutenant, Pajol, struck to the south-east, and by 4 a.m. reported that Bluecher was heading for Namur.  Such was