This delay was doubly precious to the allies.  It gave Bluecher time to bring up the corps of Pirch I. and Thielmann under cover of the high ground near Sombref, thereby raising his total force to about 87,000 men; and it enabled the two allied commanders to meet and hastily confer on the situation.  Wellington had left Brussels that morning at 8 o’clock, and thanks to Ney’s inaction, was able to reach the crest south of Quatre Bras a little after 10, long before the enemy showed any signs of life.  There he penned a note to Bluecher, asking for news from him before deciding on his operations for the day.[485] He then galloped over to the windmill of Bussy to meet Bluecher.

It was an anxious meeting; the heads of the advancing French columns were already in sight; and the Duke saw with dismay the position of the Prussians on a slope that must expose them to the full force of Napoleon’s cannon—­or, as he whispered to Hardinge, “they will be damnably mauled if they fight here."[486] In more decorous terms, but to the same effect, he warned Gneisenau, and said nothing to encourage him to hold fast to his position.  Neither did he lead him to expect aid from Quatre Bras.  The utmost that Gneisenau could get from him was the promise, “Well!  I will come provided I am not attacked myself.”  Did these words induce the Prussians to accept battle at Ligny?  It is impossible to think so.  Everything tends to show that Bluecher had determined to fight there.  The risk was great; for, as we learn from General Reiche, the position was seen to admit of no vigorous offensive blows against the French.  But fortune smiled on the veteran Field-Marshal, and averted what might have been an irretrievable disaster.[487]

It would seem that the inequalities of the ground hid the strength of Pirch I. and Thielmann; for Napoleon still believed that he had ranged against him at Ligny only a single corps.  At 2 p.m.  Soult informed Ney that the enemy had united a corps between Sombref and Bry, and that in half an hour Grouchy would attack it.  Ney was therefore to beat back the foes at Quatre-Bras, and then turn to envelop the Prussians. But if these were driven in first, the Emperor would move towards Ney to hasten his operations.[488] Not until the battle was about to begin does the Emperor seem to have realized that he was in presence of superior forces.[489] But after 2 p.m. their masses drew down over the slopes of Bry and Sombref, their foremost troops held the villages of Ligny and St. Amand, while their left crowned the ridge of Tongrines.  Napoleon reformed his lines, which had hitherto been at right angles to the main road through Fleurus.  Vandamme’s corps moved off towards St. Amand; and Gerard, after ranging his corps parallel to that road, began to descend towards Ligny, Grouchy meanwhile marshalling the cavalry to protect their flank and rear.  Behind all stood the imposing mass of the Imperial Guard on the rising ground near Fleurus.