We here approach one of the knotty questions of the campaign.  Why did not Ney occupy the cross-roads in force on the evening of the 15th?  We may note first that not till the 11th had Napoleon thought fit to summon Ney to the army, so that the Marshal did not come up till the afternoon of this very day.  He at once had an interview with the Emperor, who, according to General Gourgaud, gave the Marshal verbal orders to take command of the corps of Reille and D’Erlon, to push on northwards, take up a position at Quatre Bras, and throw out advanced posts beyond on the Brussels and Namur roads; but it seems unlikely that the Emperor would have given one of the most venturesome of his Marshals an absolute order to push on so far in advance, unless the French right wing had driven the Prussians back beyond the Sombref position.  Otherwise, Ney would have been dangerously far in advance of the main body and exposed to blows either from the Prussians or the British.

However this may be, Ney certainly felt insecure, and did not push on with his wonted dash; while, fortunately for the allies, an officer was at hand Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, who saw the need of holding Quatre Bras at all costs.[480] The young leader imposed on the foe by making the most of his men—­they were but 4,500 all told, and had only ten bullets apiece—­and he succeeded.  For once, Ney was prudent to a fault, and did not push home the attack.  In his excuse it may be said that the men of Reille’s corps, on whom he had to rely—­for D’Erlon’s corps was still far to the rear—­had been marching and fighting ever since dawn, and were too weary for another battle.  Moreover, the roar of cannon on the south-east warned him that the right wing of the French advance was hotly engaged between Gilly and Fleurus; until it beat back the Prussians, his own position was dangerously “in the air”; and, as but two hours of daylight remained, he drew back on Frasnes.  He is also said to have sent word to the Emperor that “he was occupying Quatre Bras by an advanced guard, and that his main body was close behind.”  If he deceived his chief by any such report, he deserves the severest censure; but the words quoted above were written later at St. Helena by General Gourgaud, when Ney had come to figure as the scapegoat of the campaign.[481] Ney sent in a report on that evening; but it has been lost.[482] Judging from the orders issued by Napoleon and Soult early on the 16th, there was much uncertainty as to Ney’s position.  The Emperor’s letter bids him post his first division “two leagues in front of les Quatres Chemins”; but Soult’s letter to Grouchy states that Ney is ordered to advance to the cross-roads.  Confusion was to be expected from the circumstances of the case.  Ney did not know his staff-officers, and he hastily took command of the left wing when in the midst of operations whose success, as Janin points out, largely depended on that of the right.  He therefore played a cautious game, when, as we now know, caution meant failure and daring spelt safety.