But it was just this eagerness of the Czar and the Prussians to reach Paris which kept alive Austrian fears.  A complete triumph to their arms would seal the doom of Poland and Saxony; and it has been thought that Schwarzenberg, who himself longed for peace, not only sought to save Austrian soldiers by keeping them back, but that at this time he did less than his duty in keeping touch with Bluecher.  Several times during the ensuing days the charge of treachery was hurled by the Prussians against the Austrians, and once at least by Frederick William himself.  But it seems more probable that Metternich and Schwarzenberg held their men back merely for prudential motives until the resumption of the negotiations with France should throw more light on the tangled political jungle through which the allies were groping.  It is significant that while Schwarzenberg cautiously felt about for Napoleon’s rearguard, of which he lost touch for two whole days, Metternich insisted that the peace Congress must be opened.  Caulaincourt had for several days been waiting near the allied head-quarters; and, said the Austrian Minister, it would be a breach of faith to put him off any longer now that Castlereagh had arrived.  Only when Austria threatened to withdraw from the Coalition did Alexander concede this point, and then with a very bad grace; for the resumption of the negotiations virtually tied him to the neighbourhood of Chatillon-sur-Seine, the town fixed for the Congress, while Bluecher was rapidly moving towards Paris with every prospect of snatching from the imperial brow the coveted laurel of a triumphal entry.

To prevent this interference with his own pet plans, the susceptible autocrat sent off from Bar-sur-Seine (February 7th) an order that Bluecher was not to enter Paris, but must await the arrival of the sovereigns.  The order was needless.  Napoleon, goaded to fury by the demands which the allies on that very day formulated at Chatillon, flung himself upon Bluecher and completely altered the whole military situation.  But before describing this wonderful effort, we must take a glance at the diplomatic overtures which spurred him on.

The Congress of Chatillon opened on February 5th, and on that day Castlereagh gained his point, that questions about our maritime code should be completely banished from the discussions.  Two days later the allies declared that France must withdraw within the boundaries of 1791, with the exception of certain changes made for mutual convenience and of some colonial retrocessions that England would grant to France.  The French plenipotentiary, Caulaincourt, heard this demand with a quiet but strained composure:  he reminded them that at Frankfurt they had proposed to leave France the Rhine and the Alps; he inquired what colonial sacrifices England was prepared to make if she cooped up France in her old limits in Europe.  To this our plenipotentiaries Aberdeen, Cathcart, and Stewart refused to reply until he assented to the present demand of the allies.  He very properly refused to do this; and, despite his eagerness to come to an arrangement and end the misfortunes of France, referred the matter to his master.[409]