On the question of boundaries the Czar’s views were not clearly defined; they were personal rather than territorial.  He was determined to get rid of Napoleon; but he would not, as yet, hear of the re-establishment of the Bourbons.  He disliked that dynasty in general, and Louis XVIII. in particular.  Bernadotte seemed to him a far fitter successor to Napoleon than the gouty old gentleman who for three and twenty years had been morosely flitting about Europe and issuing useless proclamations.

Here, indeed, was Napoleon’s great chance:  there was no man fit to succeed him, and he knew it.  Scarcely anyone but Bernadotte himself agreed with the Czar as to the fitness of the choice just named.  To the allies the Prince Royal of Sweden was suspect for his loiterings, and to Frenchmen he seemed a traitor.  We find that Stein disagreed with the Czar on this point, and declared that the Bourbons were the only alternative to Napoleon.  Assuredly, this was not because the great German loved that family, but simply because he saw that their very mediocrity would be a pledge that France would not again overflow her old limits and submerge Europe.

Here, then, was the strength of Castlereagh’s position.  Amidst the warping disputes and underhand intrigues his claims were clear, disinterested, and logically tenable.  Besides, they were so urged as to calm the disputants.  He quietly assured Metternich that Britain would resist the absorption of the whole of Poland and Saxony by Russia and Prussia; and on his side the Austrian statesman showed that he would not oppose the return of the Bourbons to France “from any family considerations,” provided that that act came as the act of the French nation.[406] And this was a proviso on which our Government and Wellington already laid great stress.

Castlereagh’s straightforward behaviour had an immense influence in leading Metternich to favour a more drastic solution of the French question than he had previously advocated.  The Frankfurt proposals were now quietly waived, and Metternich came to see the need of withdrawing Belgium from France and intrusting it to the House of Orange.  Still, the Austrian statesman was for concluding peace with Napoleon as soon as might be, though he confessed in his private letters that peace did not depend on the Chatillon parleys.  Some persons, he wrote, wanted the Bourbons back:  still more wished for a Regency (i.e., Marie Louise as Regent for Napoleon II.):  others said:  “Away with Napoleon, no peace is possible with him”:  the masses cried out for peace, so as to end the whole affair:  but added Metternich:  “The riddle will be solved before or in Paris."[407] There spoke the discreet opportunist, always open to the logic of facts and the persuasion of Castlereagh.

Our Minister found the sovereigns of Russia and Prussia far less tractable; and he only partially succeeded in lulling their suspicions that Metternich was hand and glove with Napoleon.  So deep was the Czar’s distrust of the Austrian statesman and commander-in-chief that he resolved to brush aside Metternich’s diplomatic pourparlers, to push on rapidly to Paris, and there dictate peace.[408]