and with the foe.  Yet these obvious precautions were not taken.  In truth, the separation of the allies was dictated more by political jealousy than by military motives.  To these political affairs we must now allude; for they had no small effect in leading Napoleon on to an illusory triumph and an irretrievable overthrow.  We will show their influence, first on the conduct of the allies, and then on the actions of Napoleon.

The alarm of Austria at the growing power of Russia and Prussia was becoming acute.  She had drawn the sword only because Napoleon’s resentment was more to be feared than Alexander’s ambition.  But all had changed since then.  The warrior who, five months ago, still had his sword at the throat of Germany, was now being pursued across the dreary flats of Champagne.  And his eastern rival, who then plaintively sued for Austria’s aid, now showed a desire to establish Russian control over all the Polish lands, indemnifying Prussia for losses in that quarter by the acquisition of Saxony.  Both of these changes would press heavily on Austria from the north; and she was determined to prevent them as far as possible.  Then there was the vexed question of the reconstruction of Germany to which we shall recur later on.  Smaller matters, involving the relations of the allies to Bernadotte, Denmark, and Switzerland further complicated the situation:  but, above all, there was the problem of the future limits and form of government of France.

On that topic there were two chief parties:  those who desired merely to clip Napoleon’s wings, and those who sought to bring back France to her old boundaries.  The Emperor Francis was still disposed to leave him the “natural frontiers,” provided he gave up all control of Germany, Holland, and Italy.  On the other side were the Czar and the forward wing of the Prussian patriots.  Frederick William was more cautious, but in the main he deferred to the Czar’s views on the boundary question.  Still, so powerful was the influence of the Emperor Francis, Metternich, and Schwarzenberg, that the two parties were evenly balanced and beset by many suspicions and fears, until the arrival of the British Foreign Minister, Castlereagh, began to restore something like confidence and concord.

The British Cabinet had decided that, as none of our three envoys then at the allied headquarters had much diplomatic experience, our Minister should go in person to supervise the course of affairs.  He reached head-quarters in the third week of January, and what Thiers has called the proud simplicity of his conduct, contrasting as it did with the uneasy finesse of Metternich and Nesselrode, imparted to his counsels a weight which they merited from their disinterestedness.  Great Britain was in a very strong position.  She had borne the brunt of the struggle before the present coalition took shape:  apart from some modest gains to Hanover, she was about to take no part in the ensuing territorial scramble:  she even offered to give up many of her oceanic conquests, provided that the European settlement would be such as to guarantee a lasting peace.[405] And this, the British Minister came to see, could not be attained while Napoleon reigned over a Great France:  the only sure pledge of peace would be the return of that country to its old frontiers, and preferably to its ancient dynasty.