NOTE TO THE THIRD EDITION.—­In order not to overcrowd these chapters with diplomatic details, I have made only the briefest reference to the Treaties signed at Teplitz on Sept. 9th, 1813, with Russia and Prussia, which cemented the fourth great Coalition; but it will be well to describe them here.

A way having been paved for a closer union by the Treaty of Kalisch (see p. 276) and by that of Reichenbach (see p. 317), it was now agreed (1) that Austria and Prussia should be restored as nearly as possible to the position which they held in 1805; (2) that the Confederation of the Rhine should be dissolved; (3) and that “full and unconditional independence” should be accorded to the princes of the other German States.  This last clause was firmly but vainly opposed by Stein and the German Unionist party.  Austria’s help was so sorely needed that she could dictate her terms, and she began to scheme for the creation of a sort of Fuerstenbund, or League of Princes, under her hegemony.  The result was seen in her Treaty of October 7th, 1813, with Bavaria, which detached that State from the French alliance and assured the success of Metternich’s plans for Germany (see pp. 354-355).  The smaller States soon followed the lead given by Bavaria; and the reconstruction of Germany on the Austrian plan was further assured by the Treaty of Chaumont (see pp. 402-403).  Thus the dire need of Austrian help felt by Russia and Prussia throughout the campaigns of 1813-1814 had no small share in moulding the future of Europe.

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CHAPTER XXXVI

FROM THE RHINE TO THE SEINE

“The Emperor Napoleon must become King of France.  Up to now all his work has been done for the Empire.  He lost the Empire when he lost his army.  When he no longer makes war for the army, he will make peace for the French people, and then he will become King of France.”—­Such were the words of the most sagacious of French statesmen to Schwarzenberg.  They were spoken on April 15th, 1813, when it still seemed likely that Napoleon would meet halfway the wishes of Austria.  Such, at least, was Talleyrand’s ardent hope.  He saw the innate absurdity of attempting to browbeat Austria, and strangle the infant Hercules of German nationality, after the Grand Army had been lost in Russia.

If this was reasonable in the spring of 1813, it was an imperative necessity at the close of the year.  Napoleon had in the meantime lost 400,000 men:  and he could not now say, as he did to Metternich of his losses in Russia, that “nearly half were Germans.”  The men who had fallen in Saxony, or who bravely held out in the Polish, German, and Spanish fortresses, were nearly all French.  They were, what the triarii were to the Roman legion, the reserves of the fighting manhood of France.  That unhappy land was growing restless under its disasters.  In Spain, Wellington had blockaded Pamplona, stormed