While exceeding his instructions on this side, Haugwitz did practically nothing to advance the chief business of his mission.  Either his own fears, or the crafty mixture of threats and flattery that cajoled so many envoys, led him to neglect the interests of Prussia, and to play into the hands of the very man whose ambition he was sent to check.  After the interview, when the envoy had retired to his lodging, Caulaincourt came up in haste to warn him that a battle was imminent, that his personal safety might be endangered, and that Napoleon requested him to repair to Vienna, where he might consult with Talleyrand on affairs of State.  Horses and an escort were ready, and Haugwitz set out for that city, where he arrived on November 30th, only to find that Talleyrand was strictly forbidden to do more than entertain him with commonplaces.  Thus, the all-important question as to the action of Prussia’s legions was again postponed, even when 150,000 Prussians and Saxons were ready to march against the French communications.

Napoleon’s letter of November 30th to Talleyrand reveals his secret anxiety at this time.  In truth, the crisis was terrible.  With a superior force in front, with the Archdukes Ferdinand and Charles threatening to raise Bohemia and Hungary on his flanks, while two Prussian armies were about to throw themselves on his rear, his position was fully as serious as that of Hannibal before Cannae, from which the Carthaginian freed himself only by that staggering blow.  Did that example inspire the French Emperor, or did he take counsel from his own boundless resources of brain and will?  Certain it is that, after a passing fit of discouragement, he braced himself for a final effort, and staked all on the effect of one mighty stroke.  In order to hurry on the battle he feigned discouragement and withdrew his lines from Austerlitz to the Goldbach.  Already he had sent General Savary to the Czar with proposals for a short truce.[40] The word truce now spelt guile; its offer through Savary, whose hands were stained with the blood of the Duc d’Enghien, was in itself an insult, and Alexander gave that envoy the coolest reception.  In return he sent Prince Dolgoruki, the leader of the bellicose youths now high in favour, who proudly declared to the French Emperor the wishes of his master for the independence of Europe—­adding among other things that Holland must be free and have Belgium added to it.

This suggestion greatly amused Napoleon, who replied that Russia ought now to think of her own advantages on the side of Turkey.  The answer convinced the Czar that Napoleon dreaded a conflict in his dangerously advanced position.  He knew not his antagonist’s resources.  Napoleon had hurried up every available regiment.  Bernadotte’s corps was recalled from the frontier of Bohemia; Friant’s division of 4,000 men was ordered up from Pressburg; and by forced marches it also was nigh at hand on the night of December 1st, worn with fatigue after covering an immense space in two days, but ready to do excellent service on the morrow.[41] By this timely concentration Napoleon raised his forces to a total of at least 73,000 men, while the enemy founded their plan on the assumption that Napoleon had less than 50,000, and would scarcely resist the onset of superior forces.