The disaster at Kulm ruined Napoleon’s campaign.  While Vandamme was making his last stand, his master at Dresden was drawing up a long Note as to the respective advantages of a march on Berlin or on Prague.  He decided on the former course, which would crush the national movement in Prussia, and bring him into touch with Davoust and the French garrisons at Kuestrin and Stettin.  “Then, if Austria begins her follies again, I shall be at Dresden with a united army.”

He looked on Austria as cowed by the blows dealt her south of Dresden, which would probably bring her to sue for peace, and he hoped that one more great battle would end the war.  The mishaps to Macdonald and Vandamme dispelled these dreams.  Still, with indomitable energy, he charged Ney to take command of Oudinot’s army (a post of which this unfortunate leader begged to be relieved) and to strike at Berlin.  He ordered Friant with a column of the Old Guard to march to Bautzen and drive in Macdonald’s stragglers with the butt ends of muskets.[365] Then, hearing how pressing was the danger of this Marshal, he himself set out secretly with the cavalry of the Guard in hope of crushing Bluecher.  But again that leader retreated (September 4th and 5th), and once more the allied Grand Army thrust its columns through the Erz and threatened Dresden.  Hurrying back in the worst of humours to defend that city, Napoleon heard bad news from the north.  On September 6th Ney had been badly beaten at Dennewitz.  In truth, that brave fighter was no tactician:  his dispositions were worse than those of Oudinot, and the obstinate bravery of the Prussians, led by Buelow and Tauenzien, wrested a victory from superior numbers.  Night alone saved Ney’s army from complete dissolution:  as it was, he lost some 9,000 killed and wounded, 15,000 prisoners along with eighty cannon, and frankly summed up the situation thus to his master:  “I have been totally beaten, and still do not know whether my army has reassembled."[366] Ultimately his army assembled and fell back behind the Elbe at Torgau.

Thus, in a fortnight (August 23rd-September 6th), Napoleon had gained a great success at Dresden, while, on the circumference of operations, his lieutenants had lost five battles—­Grossbeeren, Hagelberg, Katzbach, Kulm, and Dennewitz.  The allies could therefore contract that circumference, come into closer touch, and threaten his central intrenched camps at Pirna and Dresden.  Yet still, in pursuance of a preconcerted plan, they drew back where he advanced in person.  Thus, when he sought to drive back Schwarzenberg’s columns into Bohemia, that leader warily retired to the now impregnable passes; and the Emperor fell back on Dresden, wearied and perplexed.  As he said to Marmont:  “The chess-board is very confused:  it is only I who can know where I am.”  Yet once more he plunged into the Erzgebirge, engaged in a fruitless skirmish in the defile above Kulm, and again had to lead his troops back to Pirna and Dresden.  A third move against Bluecher led to the same wearisome result.