rear.  Even so, the French struggled stoutly for liberty.  Their leader, scorning death or surrender, flung himself with his braves on the Russians in front, but was borne down and caught, fighting to the last.  Several squadrons rushed up the steeps against the Prussians and in part hewed their way through.  Four thousand footmen held their own on a natural stronghold until their bullets failed, and the survivors surrendered.  Many more plunged into the woods and met various fates, some escaping through to their comrades, others falling before Kleist’s rearguard.  Such was the disaster of Kulm.  Apart from the unbending heroism shown by the conquered, it may be called the Caudine Forks of modern war.  A force of close on 40,000 men was nearly destroyed:  it lost all its cannon and survived only in bands of exhausted stragglers.[361]

Who is to be blamed for this disaster?  Obviously, it could not have occurred had Vandamme kept in touch with the nearest French divisions:  otherwise, these could have closed in on Kleist’s rear and captured him.  Napoleon clearly intended to support Vandamme by the corps of St. Cyr, who, early on the 28th, was charged to co-operate with that general, while Mortier covered Pirna.  But on that same morning the Emperor rode to Pirna, found that St. Cyr, Marmont, and Murat were sweeping in crowds of prisoners, and directed Berthier to order Vandamme to “penetrate into Bohemia and overwhelm the Prince of Wuertemberg."[362] Then, without waiting to organize the pursuit, he forthwith returned to Dresden, either because, as some say, the rains of the previous days had struck a chill to his system, or as Marmont, with more reason, asserts, because of his concern at the news of Macdonald’s disaster on the Katzbach.  Certain it is that he recalled his Old Guard to Dresden, busied himself with plans for a march on Berlin, and at 5.30 next morning directed Berthier to order St. Cyr to “pursue the foe to Maxen and in all directions that he has taken.”  This order led St. Cyr westwards, in pursuit of Barclay’s Russians, who had diverged sharply in that direction in order to escape Vandamme.

The eastern road to Teplitz was thus left comparatively clear, while the middle road was thronged with pursuers and pursued.[363] No directions were given by Napoleon to warn Vandamme of the gap thus left in his rear:  neither was Mortier at Pirna told to press on and keep in touch with Vandamme now that St. Cyr was some eight miles away to the west.  Doubtless St. Cyr and Mortier ought to have concerted measures for keeping in touch with Vandamme, and they deserve censure for their lack of foresight; but it was not usual, even for the Marshals, to take the initiative when the Emperor was near at hand.  To sum up:  the causes of Vandamme’s disaster were, firstly, his rapid rush into Bohemia in quest of the Marshal’s baton which was to be his guerdon of victory:  secondly, the divergence of St. Cyr westward in pursuance of Napoleon’s order of the 29th to pursue the enemy towards Maxen:  thirdly, the neglect of St. Cyr and Mortier to concert measures for the support of Vandamme along the Nollendorf road:  but, above all, the return of Napoleon to Dresden, and his neglect to secure a timely co-operation of his forces along the eastern line of pursuit.[364]