The prolonged retreat into Moravia, the unexpected feebleness of the Hapsburg arms, and the lack of supplies weighed heavily on Alexander’s spirits, as is shown in his letter from Olmuetz to the King of Prussia on November 19th:  “Our position is more than critical:  we stand almost alone against the French, who are close on our heels.  As for the Austrian army, it does not exist....  If your armies advance, the whole position will alter at once."[38] A few days later, however, when 27,000 more Russians were at hand, including his Imperial Guard, the Czar passed from the depths of depression to the heights of confidence.  The caution of his wary commander, Kutusoff, who urged a Fabian policy of delay and retreat, now began to weary him.  To retire into northern Hungary seemed ignominious.  And though Frederick William held to his resolve of not drawing the sword before December 15th, and by that time the Archduke Charles with a large army was expected below Vienna, yet the susceptible young autocrat spurned the behests of irksome prudence.  In vain did Kutusoff and Schwarzenberg urge the need of delay and retreat:  Alexander gave more heed to the rash counsels of his younger officers.  An advance was ordered on Bruenn, and a successful cavalry skirmish at Wischau confirmed the Czar in his change from the strategy of Fabius to that of Varro.

Napoleon, who was now at Bruenn, had already divined this change in the temper of his foe, and called back his men with the express purpose of humouring Alexander’s latest mood and tempting him on to a decisive battle.  He saw clearly the advantage of fighting at once.  The renewed offers of an armistice, which he received from the prudent Francis, might alone have convinced him of this; and they came in time to give him an argument, telling enough to daunt the Prussian envoy, who was now drawing near to his headquarters.

After proceeding towards Vienna and being sent back to Bruenn, Haugwitz arrived there on November 29th.[39] Of the four hours’ private conference that ensued with Napoleon we have but scanty records, and those by Haugwitz himself, who had every reason for warping the truth.  He states that he was received with icy coldness, and at once saw that the least threat of hostile pressure by Prussia would drive Napoleon to make a separate peace with Austria.  But after the first hour the Emperor appeared to thaw:  he discussed the question of a Continental peace and laid aside all resentment at Prussia’s conduct:  finally, he gave a general assent to her proposals, on two conditions, namely, that the allied force then in Hanover should not be allowed by Prussia to invade Holland, and that the French garrison in the fortress of Hameln, now compassed about by Prussians, should be provisioned.  To both of these requests Haugwitz assented, and pledged the word of his King, an act of presumption which that monarch was to repudiate.