To Davoust, at Hamburg, he expressed himself as if war was certain; and he ordered Clarke, at Paris, to have 110,000 muskets made by the end of the year, so that, in all, 400,000 would be ready.  Letters about the Congress are conspicuous by their absence; and everything proves that, as he wrote to Clarke at the beginning of the armistice, he purposed striking his great blows in September.  Little by little we see the emergence of his final plan—­to overthrow Russia and Prussia, while, for a week or two, he amused Austria with separate overtures at Prague.

But, during eight years of adversity, European statesmen had learnt that disunion spelt disaster; and it was evident that Napoleon’s delays were prompted solely by the need of equipping and training his new cavalry brigades.  As for the Congress, no one took it seriously.  Gentz, who was then in close contact with Metternich, saw how this tragi-comedy would end.  “We believe that on his return to Dresden, Napoleon will address to this Court a solemn Note in which he will accuse everybody of the delays which he himself has caused, and will end up by proclaiming a sort of ultimatum.  Our reply will be a declaration of war."[337]

This was what happened.  As July wore on and brought no peaceful overtures, but rather a tightening of Napoleon’s coils in Saxony, Bavaria, and Illyria, the Emperor Francis inclined towards war.  As late as July 18th he wrote to Metternich that he was still for peace, provided that Illyria could be gained.[338]

But the French military preparations decided him, a few days later, to make war, unless every one of the Austrian demands should be conceded by August 10th.  His counsellors had already come to that conclusion, as our records prove.  On July 20th Stadion wrote to Cathcart urging him to give pecuniary aid to General Nugent, who would wait on him to concert means for rousing a revolt against Napoleon in Tyrol and North Italy; and our envoy agreed to give L5,000 a month for the “support of 5,000 Austrians acting in communication with our squadron in the Adriatic.”  This step met with Metternich’s approval; and, when writing to Stadion from Prague (July 25th), he counselled Cathcart to send a despatch to Wellington and urge him to make a vigorous move against the south of France.  He (Metternich) would have the letter sent safely through Switzerland and the south of France direct to our general.[339]

With the solemn triflings of the Congress we need not concern ourselves.  The French plenipotentiaries saw clearly that their master “would allow of no peace but that which he should himself dictate with his foot on the enemy’s neck.”  Yet they persevered in their thankless task, for “who could tell whether the Emperor, when he found himself placed between highly favourable conditions and the fear of having 200,000 additional troops against him, might not hesitate; whether just one grain of common sense, one spark of wisdom, might not enter his head?” Alas!  That brain was now impervious to advice; and the young De Broglie, from whom we quote this extract, sums up the opinion of the French plenipotentiaries in the trenchant phrase, “the devil was in him."[340]