are now removed.  I regard this co-operation as one of the surest supports of the cause which the Powers may once more be called on to defend by a war which can only offer chances of success unless sustained by the greatest and most unanimous measures."[331] Further than this Francis could scarcely go without pledging himself unconditionally to an alliance; and doubtless it was the news of Vittoria that evoked these encouraging assurances.

It is even more certain that the compact of Trachenberg also helped to end the hesitations of Austria.  This compact arose out of the urgent need of adopting a general plan of campaign, and, above all, of ending the disputes between the allied sovereigns and Bernadotte.  The Prince Royal of Sweden had lost their confidence through his failure to save Hamburg from the French and Danes.  Yet, on his side, he had some cause for complaint.  In the previous summer, Alexander led him to expect the active aid of 35,000 Russian troops for a campaign in Norway:  but, mainly at the instance of England, he now landed in Pomerania and left Sweden exposed to a Danish attack on the side of Norway.  He therefore suggested an interview with the allied sovereigns, a request which was warmly seconded by Castlereagh.[332] Accordingly it took place at Trachenberg, a castle north of Breslau, with the happiest results.  The warmth of the great Gascon’s manner cleared away all clouds, and won the approval of Frederick William.

There was signed the famous compact, or plan, of Trachenberg (July 12th).  It bound the allies to turn their main forces against Napoleon’s chief army, wherever it was:  those allied corps that threatened his flanks or communications were to act on the line that most directly cut into them:  and the salient bastion of Bohemia was expressly named as offering the greatest advantages for attacking Napoleon’s main force.  The first and third of these axioms were directly framed so as to encourage Austria:  the second aimed at concentrating Bernadotte’s force on the main struggle and preventing his waging war merely against Denmark.

The plan went even further:  100,000 allied troops were to be sent into Bohemia, as soon as the armistice should cease, so as to form in all an army of 200,000 men.  On the north, Bernadotte, after detaching a corps towards Hamburg, was to advance with a Russo-Prusso-Swedish army of 70,000 men towards the middle course of the Elbe, his objective being Leipzig; and the rest of the allied forces, those remaining in Silesia, were to march towards Torgau, and thus threaten Napoleon’s positions in Saxony from the East.  This plan of campaign was an immense advance on those of the earlier coalitions.  There was no reliance here on lines and camps:  the days of Mack and Phull were past:  the allies had at last learnt from Napoleon the need of seeking out the enemy’s chief army, and of flinging at it all the available forces.  Politically, also, the compact deserves notice.  In concerting a plan of offensive operations from Bohemia, the allies were going far to determine the conduct of Austria.