Reflection, however, showed him that the fault was his own; that if, as had occurred to him when he left Paris, he had intrusted the supreme command in Spain to Soult, the disaster would never have happened.[322] His belief in Soult’s capacity was justified by the last events of the Peninsular War.  But neither his splendid rally of the scattered French forces, nor the skilful movements of Clausel and Suchet, nor the stubborn defence of Pamplona and San Sebastian, could now save the French cause.  The sole result of these last operations was to restore the lustre of the French arms and to keep 150,000 men in Spain when the scales of war were wavering in the plains of Saxony.

Napoleon’s letters betray the agitation which he felt even at the first vague rumours of the disaster of Vittoria.  On the first three days of July he penned at Dresden seven despatches on that topic in a style so vehement that the compilers of the “Correspondance de Napoleon” have thought it best to omit them.  He further enjoined the utmost reserve, and ordered the official journals merely to state that, after a brisk engagement at Vittoria, the French army was concentrating in Arragon, and that the British had captured about a hundred guns and wagons left behind in the town for lack of horses.

There was every reason for hiding the truth.  He saw how seriously it must weaken his chances of browbeating the Eastern Powers, and of punishing Austria for her armed mediation.  Hitherto there seemed every chance of his succeeding.  The French standards flew on all the fortresses of the Elbe and Oder.  Hamburg was fast becoming a great French camp, and Denmark was ranged on the side of France.

Indeed, on reviewing the situation on June 4th, the German publicist, Gentz, came to the conclusion that the Emperor Francis would probably end his vacillations by some inglorious compromise.  The Kaiser desired peace; but he also wished to shake off the irksome tutelage of his son-in-law, and regain Illyria.  For the present he wavered.  Before the news of Luetzen reached him, he undoubtedly encouraged the allies:  but that reverse brought about a half left turn towards Napoleon.  “Boney’s success at Luetzen,” wrote Sir G. Jackson in his Diary, “has made Francis reconsider his half-formed resolutions.”  Here was the chief difficulty for the allies.  Their fortunes, and the future of Europe, rested largely on the decision of a man whose natural irresolution of character had been increased by adversity.  Fortunately, the news from Spain finally helped to incline him towards war; but for some weeks his decision remained the unknown quantity in European politics.  Fortunately, too, he was amenable to the gentle but determining pressure of the kind which Metternich could so skilfully exert.  That statesman, as usual, schemed and balanced.  He saw that Austria had much to gain by playing the waiting game.  Her forces were improving both in numbers and efficiency, and under cover of her offer of armed mediation were holding strong positions in Bohemia.  In fact, she was regaining her prestige, and might hope to impose her will on the combatants at the forthcoming European Congress at Prague.  Metternich, therefore, continued to pose as the well-wisher of both parties and the champion of a reasonable and therefore durable compromise.