But Clausel and Foy took their orders, not from the King, but from Paris; and up to June 5th, Joseph heard not a word from Clausel.  At last, on June 15th, that general wrote from Pamplona that he had received Joseph’s commands of May 30th and June 7th, and would march to join him.  Had he at once called in his mobile columns and covered with all haste the fifty miles that separated him from the King, the French army would have been the stronger by at least 14,000 men.  But his concentration was a work of some difficulty, and he finally drew near to Vittoria on June 22nd, when the French cause was irrecoverably lost.[316]

Wellington, meanwhile, had foreseen the supreme need of despatch.  Early in the year he had urged our naval authorities to strengthen our squadron on the north of Spain, so that he might in due course make Santander his base of supplies.  Naval support was not forthcoming to the extent that he expected;[317] but after leaving Burgos he was able to make some use of the northern ports, thereby shortening his line of communications.  In fact, the Vittoria campaign illustrates the immense advantages gained by a leader, who is sure of his rear and of one flank, over an enemy who is ever nervous about his communications.  The British squadron acted like a covering force on the north to Wellington:  it fed the guerilla warfare in Biscay, and menaced Joseph with real though invisible dangers.  This explains, in large measure, why our commander moved forward so rapidly, and pushed forward his left wing with such persistent daring.  Mountain fastnesses and roaring torrents stayed not the advance of his light troops on that side.  Near the sources of the Ebro, the French again felt their communications with France threatened, and falling back from the main stream, up the defile carved out by a tributary, the Zadora, they halted wearily in the basin of Vittoria.

There Joseph and Jourdan determined to fight.  As usual, there had been recriminations at headquarters.  “Jourdan, ill and angry, kept his room; and the King was equally invisible."[318] Few orders were given.  The town was packed with convoys and vehicles of all kinds, and it was not till dawn of that fatal midsummer’s day that the last convoy set out for France, under the escort of 3,000 troops.  Nevertheless, Joseph might hope to hold his own.  True, he had but 70,000 troops at hand, or perhaps even fewer; yet on the evening of the 19th he heard that Clausel had set out from Pamplona.

At once he bade him press on his march, but that message fell into the enemy’s hands.[319] Relying, then, on help which was not to arrive, Joseph confronted the allied army.  It numbered, in all, 83,000 men, though Napier asserts that not more than 60,000 took part in the fighting.  The French left wing rested on steep hills near Puebla, which tower above the River Zadora, and leave but a narrow defile.  Their centre held a less precipitous ridge, which trends