one thought to be possible.  The Archduke now urged the need of an immediate retreat towards Munich, and marched in an easterly direction on Guenzburg:  another Austrian division of 8,000 men moved on Wertingen, where, on October 8th, it was furiously attacked by the troops of Murat and Lannes.  At first the Imperialists firmly kept their ranks; but the unequal contest closed with a hasty flight, which left 2,000 men in the hands of the French Then Murat, pressing on through the woods, cut off Mack’s retreat to Augsburg.  Yet that general still took a cheerful view of his position.  On that same day he wrote from Guenzburg that, as soon as the enemy had passed over the Lech, he would cross the Danube and cut their communications at Noerdlingen.  He wrote thus when Ney’s corps was striving to seize the Danube bridges below Ulm.  If Mack were to march north-east against the French communications it was of the utmost importance for him to hold the chief of these bridges:  but Ney speedily seized three of them, and on the 9th was able to draw closer the toils around Ulm.

From his position at Augsburg the French Emperor now directed the final operations; and, as before Marengo, he gave most heed to that side by which he judged his enemy would strive to break through, in this case towards Kempten and Tyrol.  This would doubtless have been Mack’s safest course; for he was strong enough to brush aside Soult, gain Tyrol, seal up its valleys against Napoleon, and carry reinforcements to the Archduke Charles.  But he was still intent on his Noerdlingen scheme, even after the loss of the Danube bridges exposed his march thither to flank attacks from the four French corps now south of the river.  Nevertheless, Napoleon’s miscalculation of Mack’s plans, or, as Thiers has striven to prove, a misunderstanding of his orders by Murat, gave the Austrians a chance such as fortune rarely bestows.[30]

In spite of Ney’s protests, one of his divisions, that led by Dupont, had been left alone to guard the northern bank of the Danube, a position where it might have been overwhelmed by an enterprising foe.  What is more extraordinary, Dupont, with only 6,000 men, was charged to advance on Ulm, and carry it by storm.  On the 11th he accordingly advanced against Mack’s fortified camp north of that city.  The Austrians met him in force, and, despite the utmost heroism of his troops, finally wrested the village of Hasslach from his grasp; later in the day a cloud of their horsemen, swooping round his right wing, cut up his tired troops, took 1,000 prisoners, and left 1,500 dead and wounded on the field.  Among the booty was found a despatch of Napoleon ordering Dupont to carry Ulm by storm—­which might have shown them that the French Emperor believed that city to be all but deserted.[31] In truth, Napoleon’s miscalculation opened for Mack a path of safety; and had he at once marched away to the north, the whole aspect of affairs might have changed.  The Russian