and a King whose reason was now hopelessly overclouded, weakened by the strangling grip of the Continental System, England seemed on the verge of ruin; and, encouraged alike by the factious conduct of our parliamentary Opposition and by Soult’s recent conquest of Andalusia, Napoleon bent himself to the final grapple by extending his coast system, and by sending Massena and his choicest troops into Spain to drive the leopards into the sea.

The limits of our space prevent any description of the ensuing campaign of Torres Vedras; and we must refer our readers to the ample canvas of Napier if they would realize the sagacity of Wellington in constructing to the north of Lisbon that mighty tete de pont for the Sea Power against Massena’s veteran army.  After dealing the staggering blow of Busaco at that presumptuous Marshal, our great leader fell back, through a tract which he swept bare of supplies, on this sure bulwark, and there watched the French host of some 65,000 men waste away amidst the miseries of hunger and the rains and diseases of autumn.  At length, in November, Massena drew off to positions near Santarem, where he awaited the succour which Napoleon ordered Soult to bring.  It was in vain:  Soult, puffed up by his triumphs in Andalusia, was resolved to play his own game and reduce Badajoz; he won his point but marred the campaign; and, at last, foiled by Wellington’s skilful tactics, Massena beat a retreat northwards out of Portugal after losing some 35,000 men (March, 1811).  Wellington’s success bore an immeasurable harvest of results.  The unmanly whinings of the English Opposition were stilled; the replies of the Czar to Napoleon’s demands grew firmer; and the patriots of the Peninsula stiffened their backs in a resistance so stubborn, albeit unskilful, that 370,000 French troops utterly failed to keep Wellington in check, and to stamp out the national defence in the summer of 1811.

In truth, Napoleon had exasperated the Spaniards no less than their soi disant king, by a series of provocations extending over the year 1810.  On the plea that Spain must herself meet the expenses of the war, he erected the four northern provinces into commands for French generals, who were independent of his brother’s authority and levied all the taxes over that vast area (February).  On May 29th he withdrew Burgos and Valladolid from Joseph’s control, and divided the greater part of Spain for military and administrative purposes into districts that were French satrapies in all but name.  The decree was doubly disastrous:  it gave free play to the feuds of the French chiefs; and it seemed to the Spaniards to foreshadow a speedy partition of Spain.  The surmise was correct.  Napoleon intended to unite to France the lands between the Pyrenees and the Ebro.  Indeed, in his conception, the conquest of Portugal was mainly desirable because it would provide his brother with an indemnity in the west for the loss of his northern provinces.  Joseph’s protests