750 prisoners (November 12th).  This defeat at Caldiero—­for it is idle to speak of it merely as a check—­opened up a gloomy vista of disasters for the French; and Bonaparte, though he disguised his fears before his staff and the soldiery, forthwith wrote to the Directors that the army felt itself abandoned at the further end of Italy, and that this fair conquest seemed about to be lost.  With his usual device of under-rating his own forces and exaggerating those of his foes, he stated that the French both at Verona and Rivoli were only 18,000, while the grand total of the Imperialists was upwards of 50,000.  But he must have known that for the present he had to deal with rather less than half that number.  The greater part of the Tyrolese force had not as yet descended the Adige below Roveredo; and allowing for detachments and losses, Alvintzy’s array at Caldiero barely exceeded 20,000 effectives.

Bonaparte now determined to hazard one of the most daring turning movements which history records.  It was necessary at all costs to drive Alvintzy from the heights of Caldiero before the Tyrolese columns should overpower Vaubois’ detachment at Rivoli and debouch in the plains west of Verona.  But, as Caldiero could not be taken by a front attack, it must be turned by a flanking movement.  To any other general than Bonaparte this would have appeared hopeless; but where others saw nothing but difficulties, his eye discerned a means of safety.  South and south-east of those hills lies a vast depression swamped by the flood waters of the Alpon and the Adige.  Morasses stretch for some miles west of the village of Arcola, through which runs a road up the eastern bank of the Alpon, crossing that stream at the aforenamed village and leading to the banks of the Adige opposite the village of Ronco; another causeway, diverging from the former a little to the north of Ronco, leads in a north-westerly direction towards Porcil.  By advancing from Ronco along these causeways, and by seizing Arcola, Bonaparte designed to outflank the Austrians and tempt them into an arena where the personal prowess of the French veterans would have ample scope, and where numbers would be of secondary importance.  Only heads of columns could come into direct contact; and the formidable Austrian cavalry could not display its usual prowess.  On these facts Bonaparte counted as a set-off to his slight inferiority in numbers.

In the dead of night the divisions of Augereau and Massena retired through Verona.  Officers and soldiers were alike deeply discouraged by this movement, which seemed to presage a retreat towards the Mincio and the abandonment of Lombardy.  To their surprise, when outside the gate they received the order to turn to the left down the western bank of the Adige.  At Ronco the mystery was solved.  A bridge of boats had there been thrown across the Adige; and, crossing this without opposition, Augereau’s troops rapidly advanced along the causeway leading to Arcola and