A strange incident serves to illustrate the hazards of war and the confusion of this part of the campaign.  A detachment of the vanquished Austrian forces some 4,000 strong, unable to join their comrades at Gavardo or Peschiera, and yet unharmed by the victorious pursuers, wandered about on the hills, and on the next day chanced near Lonato to come upon a much smaller detachment of French.  Though unaware of the full extent of their good fortune, the Imperialists boldly sent an envoy to summon the French commanding officer to surrender.  When the bandage was taken from his eyes, he was abashed to find himself in the presence of Bonaparte, surrounded by the generals of his staff.  The young commander’s eyes flashed fire at the seeming insult, and in tones vibrating with well-simulated passion he threatened the envoy with condign punishment for daring to give such a message to the commander-in-chief at his headquarters in the midst of his army.  Let him and his men forthwith lay down their arms.  Dazed by the demand, and seeing only the victorious chief and not the smallness of his detachment, 4,000 Austrians surrendered to 1,200 French, or rather to the address and audacity of one master-mind.

Elated by this augury of further victory, the republicans prepared for the decisive blow.  Wuermser, though checked on August 3rd, had been so far reinforced from Mantua as still to indulge hopes of driving the French from Castiglione and cutting his way through to rescue Quosdanovich.  He was, indeed, in honour bound to make the attempt; for the engagement had been made, with the usual futility that dogged the Austrian councils, to reunite their forces and fight the French on the 7th of August.  These cast-iron plans were now adhered to in spite of their dislocation at the hands of Bonaparte and Augereau.  Wuermser’s line stretched from near the village of Medole in a north-easterly direction across the high-road between Brescia and Mantua; while his right wing was posted in the hilly country around Solferino.  In fact, his extreme right rested on the tower-crowned heights of Solferino, where the forces of Austria two generations later maintained so desperate a defence against the onset of Napoleon III. and his liberating army.

Owing to the non-arrival of Mezaros’ corps marching from Legnago, Wuermser mustered scarcely twenty-five thousand men on his long line; while the very opportune approach of part of Serurier’s division, under the lead of Fiorella, from the south, gave the French an advantage even in numbers.  Moreover, Fiorella’s advance on the south of Wuermser’s weaker flank, that near Medole, threatened to turn it and endanger the Austrian communications with Mantua.  The Imperialists seem to have been unaware of this danger; and their bad scouting here as elsewhere was largely responsible for the issue of the day.  Wuermser’s desire to stretch a helping hand to Quosdanovich near Lonato and his confidence in the strength of his own right