This apparently desperate step, which seemed to forebode the abandonment not only of the siege of Mantua, but of the whole of Lombardy, was in reality a masterstroke.  Bonaparte had perceived the truth, which the campaigns of 1813 and 1870 were abundantly to illustrate—­that the possession of fortresses, and consequently their siege by an invader, is of secondary importance when compared with a decisive victory gained in the open.  When menaced by superior forces advancing towards the south of Lake Garda, he saw that he must sacrifice his siege works, even his siege-train, in order to gain for a few precious days that superiority in the field which the division of the Imperialist columns still left to him.

The dates of these occurrences deserve close scrutiny; for they suffice to refute some of the exorbitant claims made at a later time by General Augereau, that only his immovable firmness forced Bonaparte to fight and to change his dispositions of retreat into an attack which re-established everything.  This extraordinary assertion, published by Augereau after he had deserted Napoleon in 1814, is accompanied by a detailed recital of the events of July 30th-August 5th, in which Bonaparte appears as the dazed and discouraged commander, surrounded by pusillanimous generals, and urged on to fight solely by the confidence of Augereau.  That the forceful energy of this general had a great influence in restoring the morale of the French army in the confused and desperate movements which followed may freely be granted.  But his claims to have been the main spring of the French movements in those anxious days deserve a brief examination.  He asserts that Bonaparte, “devoured by anxieties,” met him at Roverbella late in the evening of July 30th, and spoke of retiring beyond the River Po.  The official correspondence disproves this assertion.  Bonaparte had already given orders to Serurier to retire beyond the Po with his artillery train; but this was obviously an attempt to save it from the advancing Austrians; and the commander had ordered the northern part of the French besieging force to join Augereau between Roverbella and Goito.  Augereau further asserts that, after he had roused Bonaparte to the need of a dash to recover Brescia, the commander-in-chief remarked to Berthier, “In that case we must raise the siege of Mantua,” which again he (Augereau) vigorously opposed.  This second statement is creditable neither to Augereau’s accuracy nor to his sagacity.  The order for the raising of the siege had been issued, and it was entirely necessary for the concentration of French troops, on which Bonaparte now relied as his only hope against superior force.  Had Bonaparte listened to Augereau’s advice and persisted still in besieging Mantua, the scattered French forces must have been crushed in detail.  Augereau’s words are those of a mere fighter, not of a strategist; and the timidity which he ungenerously attributed to Bonaparte was nothing but the caution which a superior intellect saw to be a necessary prelude to a victorious move.