Meanwhile the peace with the House of Savoy had thrown open the Milanese to Bonaparte’s attack.  Holding three Sardinian fortresses, he had an excellent base of operations; for the lands restored to the King of Sardinia were to remain subject to requisitions for the French army until the general peace.  The Austrians, on the other hand, were weakened by the hostility of their Italian subjects, and, worst of all, they depended ultimately on reinforcements drawn from beyond the Alps by way of Mantua.  In the rich plains of Lombardy they, however, had one advantage which was denied to them among the rocks of the Apennines.  Their generals could display the tactical skill on which they prided themselves, and their splendid cavalry had some chance of emulating the former exploits of the Hungarian and Croatian horse.  They therefore awaited the onset of the French, little dismayed by recent disasters, and animated by the belief that their antagonist, unversed in regular warfare, would at once lose in the plains the bubble reputation gained in ravines.  But the country in the second part of this campaign was not less favourable to Bonaparte’s peculiar gifts than that in which he had won his first laurels as commander.  Amidst the Apennines, where only small bodies of men could be moved, a general inexperienced in the handling of cavalry and infantry could make his first essays in tactics with fair chances of success.  Speed, energy, and the prompt seizure of a commanding central position were the prime requisites; the handling of vast masses of men was impossible.  The plains of Lombardy facilitated larger movements; but even here the numerous broad swift streams fed by the Alpine snows, and the network of irrigating dykes, favoured the designs of a young and daring leader who saw how to use natural obstacles so as to baffle and ensnare his foes.  Bonaparte was now to show that he excelled his enemies, not only in quickness of eye and vigour of intellect, but also in the minutiae of tactics and in those larger strategic conceptions which decide the fate of nations.  In the first place, having the superiority of force, he was able to attack.  This is an advantage at all times:  for the aggressor can generally mislead his adversary by a series of feints until the real blow can be delivered with crushing effect.  Such has been the aim of all great leaders from the time of Epaminondas and Alexander, Hannibal and Caesar, down to the age of Luxembourg, Marlborough, and Frederick the Great.  Aggressive tactics were particularly suited to the French soldiery, always eager, active, and intelligent, and now endowed with boundless enthusiasm in their cause and in their leader.