laws, drew up an instrument of government, which, though republican in form, seemed to offer all the stability of the most firmly rooted oligarchy.  Some such compromise was perhaps necessary; for the Commonwealth was confronted by three dangers, anarchy resulting from the pressure of the mob, an excessive centralization of power in the hands of two committees, and the possibility of a coup d’etat by some pretender or adventurer.  Indeed, the student of French history cannot fail to see that this is the problem which is ever before the people of France.  It has presented itself in acute though diverse phases in 1797,1799,1814, 1830, 1848, 1851, and in 1871.  Who can say that the problem has yet found its complete solution?

In some respects the constitution which the Convention voted in August, 1795, was skilfully adapted to meet the needs of the time.  Though democratic in spirit, it granted a vote only to those citizens who had resided for a year in some dwelling and had paid taxes, thus excluding the rabble who had proved to be dangerous to any settled government.  It also checked the hasty legislation which had brought ridicule on successive National Assemblies.  In order to moderate the zeal for the manufacture of decrees, which had often exceeded one hundred a month, a second or revising chamber was now to be formed on the basis of age; for it had been found that the younger the deputies the faster came forth the fluttering flocks of decrees, that often came home to roost in the guise of curses.  A senatorial guillotine, it was now proposed, should thin out the fledglings before they flew abroad at all.  Of the seven hundred and fifty deputies of France, the two hundred and fifty oldest men were to form the Council of Ancients, having powers to amend or reject the proposals emanating from the Council of Five Hundred.  In this Council were the younger deputies, and with them rested the sole initiation of laws.  Thus the young deputies were to make the laws, but the older deputies were to amend or reject them; and this nice adjustment of the characteristics of youth and age, a due blending of enthusiasm with caution, promised to invigorate the body politic and yet guard its vital interests.  Lastly, in order that the two Councils should continuously represent the feelings of France, one third of their members must retire for re-election every year, a device which promised to prevent any violent change in their composition, such as might occur if, at the end of their three years’ membership, all were called upon to resign at once.

But the real crux of constitution builders had hitherto been in the relations of the Legislature to the Executive.  How should the brain of the body politic, that is, the Legislature, be connected with the hand, that is, the Executive?  Obviously, so argued all French political thinkers, the two functions were distinct and must be kept separate.  The results of this theory of the separation of powers were clearly traceable