[Footnote 45:  Periods of ten days, which, in the revolutionary calendar, superseded the week.]

[Footnote 46:  I have followed the accounts given by Jomini, vol. viii., pp. 120-130; that by Schels in the “Oest.  Milit.  Zeitschrift” for 1825, vol. ii.; also Bouvier “Bonaparte en Italie,” ch. xiii.; and J.G.’s “Etudes sur la Campagne de 1796-97.”  Most French accounts, being based on Napoleon’s “Memoires,” vol. iii., p. 212 et seq., are a tissue of inaccuracies.  Bonaparte affected to believe that at Lodi he defeated an army of sixteen thousand men.  Thiers states that the French cavalry, after fording the river at Montanasso, influenced the result:  but the official report of May 11th, 1796, expressly states that the French horse could not cross the river at that place till the fight was over.  See too Desvernois, “Mems.,” ch, vii.]

[Footnote 47:  Bouvier (p. 533) traces this story to Las Cases and discredits it.]

[Footnote:  48 Directorial despatch of May 7th, 1796.  The date rebuts the statement of M. Aulard, in M. Lavisse’s recent volume, “La Revolution Francaise,” p. 435, that Bonaparte suggested to the Directory the pillage of Lombardy.]

[Footnote 49:  “Corresp.,” June 6th, 1797.]

[Footnote 50:  “Corresp.,” June 1st, 1796.]

[Footnote 51:  Gaffarel, “Bonaparte et les Republiques Italiennes,” p. 22.]

[Footnote 52:  “Corresp.,” May 17th, 1796.]

[Footnote 53:  Virgil, Aeneid, x. 200.]

[Footnote 54:  Colonel Graham’s despatches.]

[Footnote 55:  “Corresp.,” June 26th, 1796.]

[Footnote 56:  Despatch of Francis to Wuermser, July 14th, 1796.]

[Footnote 57:  Jomini (vol. viii., p. 305) blames Weyrother, the chief of Wuermser’s staff, for the plan.  Jomini gives the precise figures of the French on July 25th:  Massena had 15,000 men on the upper Adige; Augereau, 5,000 near Legnago; Sauret, 4,000 at Salo; Serurier, 10,500 near Mantua; and with others at and near Peschiera the total fighting strength was 45,000.  So “J.G.,” p. 103.]

[Footnote 58:  See Thiebault’s amusing account ("Memoirs,” vol. i., ch. xvi.) of Bonaparte’s contempt for any officer who could not give him definite information, and of the devices by which his orderlies played on this foible.  See too Bourrienne for Bonaparte’s dislike of new faces.]

[Footnote 59:  Marbot, “Memoires,” ch. xvi.  J.G., in his recent work, “Etudes sur la Campagne de 1796-97,” p. 115, also defends Augereau.]

[Footnote 60:  Jomini, vol. viii., p. 321.]

[Footnote 61:  “English Hist.  Review,” January, 1899]

[Footnote 62:  Such is the judgment of Clausewitz ("Werke,” vol. iv.), and it is partly endorsed by J.G. in his “Etudes sur la Campagne de 1796-97.”  St. Cyr, in his “Memoirs” on the Rhenish campaigns, also blames Bonaparte for not having earlier sent away his siege-train to a place of safety.  Its loss made the resumed siege of Mantua little more than a blockade.]