[Footnote 35:  Chaptal, “Mes Souvenirs sur Napoleon,” p. 198.]

[Footntoe 36:  Koch, “Memoires de Massena,” vol. ii., p. 13, credits the French with only 37,775 men present with the colours, the Austrians with 32,000, and the Sardinians with 20,000.  All these figures omit the troops in garrison or guarding communications.]

[Footnote 37:  Napoleon’s “Correspondence,” March 28th, 1796.]

[Footnote 38:  See my articles on Colonel Graham’s despatches from Italy in the “Eng.  Hist.  Review” of January and April, 1899.]

[Footnote 39:  Thus Mr. Sargent ("Bonaparte’s First Campaign”) says that Bonaparte was expecting Beaulieu to move on Genoa, and saw herein a chance of crushing the Austrian centre.  But Bonaparte, in his despatch of April 6th to the Directory, referring to the French advance towards Genoa, writes:  “J’ai ete tres fache et extremement mecontent de ce mouvement sur Genes, d’autant plus deplace qu’il a oblige cette republique a prendre une attitude hostile, et a reveille l’ennemi que j’aurais pris tranquille:  ce sont des hommes de plus qu’il nous en coutera.”  For the question how far Napoleon was indebted to Marshal Maillebois’ campaign of 1745 for his general design, see the brochure of M. Pierron.  His indebtedness has been proved by M. Bouvier ("Bonaparte en Italie,” p. 197) and by Mr. Wilkinson ("Owens Coll.  Hist.  Essays").]

[Footnote 40:  Nelson was then endeavouring to cut off the vessels conveying stores from Toulon to the French forces.  The following extracts from his despatches are noteworthy.  January 6th, 1796:  “If the French mean to carry on the war, they must penetrate into Italy.  Holland and Flanders, with their own country, they have entirely stripped:  Italy is the gold mine, and if once entered, is without the means of resistance.”  Then on April 28th, after Piedmont was overpowered by the French:  “We English have to regret that we cannot always decide the fate of Empires on the Sea.”  Again, on May 16th:  “I very much believe that England, who commenced the war with all Europe for her allies, will finish it by having nearly all Europe for her enemies.”]

[Footnote 41:  The picturesque story of the commander (who was not Rampon, but Fornesy) summoning the defenders of the central redoubt to swear on their colours and on the cannon that they would defend it to the death has been endlessly repeated by historians.  But the documents which furnish the only authentic details show that there was in the redoubt no cannon and no flag.  Fornesy’s words simply were:  “C’est ici, mes amis, qu’il faut vaincre ou mourir”—­surely much grander than the histrionic oath. (See “Memoires de Massena,” Yol. ii.;” Pieces Just.,” No. 3; also Bouvier, op. cit.)]

[Footnote 42:  Jomini, vol. viii., p. 340; “Pieces Justifs.”]

[Footnote 43:  “Un Homme d’autrefois,” par Costa de Beauregard.]

[Footnote 44:  These were General Beaulieu’s words to Colonel Graham on May 22nd.]