which for several years deepened the pallor of his cheeks and furrowed the rings under his eyes, giving him that uncanny, almost spectral, look which struck a chill to all who saw him first and knew not the fiery energy that burnt within.  There, too, his zeal, his unfailing resource, his bulldog bravery, and that indefinable quality which separates genius from talent speedily conquered the hearts of the French soldiery.  One example of this magnetic power must here suffice.  He had ordered a battery to be made so near to Fort Mulgrave that Salicetti described it as within a pistol-shot of the English guns.  Could it be worked, its effect would be decisive.  But who could work it?  The first day saw all its gunners killed or wounded, and even the reckless Jacobins flinched from facing the iron hail.  “Call it the battery of the fearless,” ordered the young captain.  The generous French nature was touched at its tenderest point, personal and national honour, and the battery thereafter never lacked its full complement of gunners, living and dead.

The position at Fort Mulgrave, or the Little Gibraltar, was, indeed, all important; for if the republicans seized that commanding position, the allied squadrons could be overpowered, or at least compelled to sail away; and with their departure Toulon must fall.

Here we come on to ground that has been fiercely fought over in wordy war.  Did Bonaparte originate the plan of attack?  Or did he throw his weight and influence into a scheme that others beside him had designed?  Or did he merely carry out orders as a subordinate?  According to the Commissioner Barras, the last was the case.  But Barras was with the eastern wing of the besiegers, that is, some miles away from the side of La Seyne and L’Eguillette, where Buonaparte fought.  Besides, Barras’ “Memoires” are so untruthful where Buonaparte is concerned, as to be unworthy of serious attention, at least on these points.[22] The historian M. Jung likewise relegates Buonaparte to a quite subordinate position.[23] But his narrative omits some of the official documents which show that Buonaparte played a very important part in the siege.  Other writers claim that Buonaparte’s influence on the whole conduct of operations was paramount and decisive.  Thus, M. Duruy quotes the letter of the Commissioners to the Convention:  “We shall take care not to lay siege to Toulon by ordinary means, when we have a surer means to reduce it, that is, by burning the enemy’s fleet....  We are only waiting for the siege-guns before taking up a position whence we may reach the ships with red-hot balls; and we shall see if we are not masters of Toulon.”  But this very letter disproves the Buonapartist claim.  It was written on September 13th.  Thus, three days before Buonaparte’s arrival, the Commissioners had fully decided on attacking the Little Gibraltar; and the claim that Buonaparte originated the plan can only be sustained by antedating his arrival at Toulon.[24] In fact, every experienced officer among besiegers and besieged saw the weak point of the defence:  early in September Hood and Mulgrave began the fortification of the heights behind L’Eguillette.  In face of these facts, the assertion that Buonaparte was the first to design the movements which secured the surrender of Toulon must be relegated to the domain of hero-worship. (See note on p. 56.)