Unmeasured abuse has been showered upon Villeneuve for his retreat to that harbour.  But it must be remembered that in both of Napoleon’s last orders to him, those of July 16th and 26th, he was required to sail to Cadiz under certain conditions.  In the first order prescribing alternative ways of gaining the mastery of the Channel, that step was recommended solely as a last alternative in case of misfortune:  he was directed not to enter the long and difficult inlet of Ferrol, but, after collecting the squadron there, to cast anchor at Cadiz.  In the order of July 26th he was charged positively to repair to Cadiz:  “My intention is that you rally at Cadiz the Spanish ships there, disembark your sick, and, without stopping there more than four days at most, again set sail, return to Ferrol, etc.”  Villeneuve seems not to have received these last orders, but he alludes to those of July 16th.[334]

These, then, were probably the last instructions he received from Napoleon before setting sail from the roads of Corunna on August 13th.  The censures passed on his retreat to Cadiz are therefore based on the supposition that he received instructions which he did not receive.[335] He expressly based his move to Cadiz on Napoleon’s orders of July 16th.  The mishaps which the Emperor then contemplated as necessitating such a step had, in Villeneuve’s eyes, actually happened.  The admiral considered the fight of July 22nd la malheureuse affaire; his ships were encumbered with sick; they worked badly; on August 15th a north-east gale carried away the top-mast of a Spanish ship; and having heard from a Danish merchantman the news—­false news, as it afterwards appeared—­that Cornwallis with twenty-five ships was to the north, he turned and scudded before the wind.  He could not divine the disastrous influence of his conduct on the plan of invasion.  He did not know that his master was even then beginning to hesitate between a dash on London or a campaign on the Danube, and that the events of the next few days were destined to tilt the fortunes of the world.  Doubtless he ought to have disregarded the Emperor’s words about Cadiz and to have struggled on to Brest, as his earlier and wider orders enjoined.  But the Emperor’s instructions pointed to Cadiz as the rendezvous in case of misfortune or great difficulty.  As a matter of fact, Napoleon on July 26th ordered the Rochefort squadron to meet Villeneuve at Cadiz; and it is clear that by that date Napoleon had decided on that rendezvous, apparently because it could be more easily entered and cleared than Ferrol, and was safer from attack.  But, as it happened, the Rochefort squadron had already set sail and failed to sight an enemy or friend for several weeks.