he chose to serve with the chaloupes “because of his conviction that all these flotillas were nothing but bugbears and would never attempt the invasion so much talked of and in which so few persons really believe.”  The same was the opinion of the veteran General Dumouriez, who, now an exile in England, drew up for our Government a long report on the proposed invasion and the means of thwarting it.  The reports of our spies also prove that all experienced seamen on the Continent declared Napoleon’s project to be either a ruse or a foolhardy venture.

The compiler of the Ney “Memoirs,” who was certainly well acquainted with the opinions of that Marshal, then commanding the troops at Boulogne, also believed that the flotilla was only able to serve as a gigantic ferry.[322] The French admirals were still better aware of the terrible risks to their crowded craft in a fight out at sea.  They also pointed out that the difference in the size, draught, and speed of the boats must cause the dispersion of the flotilla, when its parts might fall a prey to the more seaworthy vessels of the enemy.  Indeed, the only chance of crossing without much loss seemed to be offered by a protracted calm, when the British cruisers would be helpless against a combined attack of a cloud of row-boats.  The risks would be greater during a fog, when the crowd of boats must be liable to collision, stranding on shoals, and losing their way.  Even the departure of this quaint armada presented grave difficulties:  it was found that the whole force could not clear the harbour in a single tide; and a part of the flotilla must therefore remain exposed to the British fire before the whole mass could get under way.  For all these reasons Bruix, the commander of the flotilla, and Decres, Minister of Marine, dissuaded Napoleon from attempting the descent without the support of a powerful covering fleet.

Napoleon’s correspondence shows that, by the close of the year 1803, he had abandoned that first fatuous scheme which gained him from the wits of Paris the soubriquet of “Don Quixote de la Manche."[323] On the 7th of December he wrote to Gantheaume, maritime prefect at Toulon, urging him to press on the completion of his nine ships of the line and five frigates, and sketching plans of a naval combination that promised to insure the temporary command of the Channel.  Of these only two need be cited here: 

1.  “The Toulon squadron will set out on 20th nivose (January 10th, 1804), will arrive before Cadiz (or Lisbon), will find there the Rochefort squadron, will sail on without making land, between Brest and the Sorlingues, will touch at Cape La Hogue, and will pass in forty-eight hours before Boulogne:  thence it will continue to the mouth of the Scheldt (there procuring masts, cordage, and all needful things)—­or perhaps to Cherbourg.

2.  “The Rochefort squadron will set out on 20th nivose, will reach Toulon the 20th pluviose: the united squadrons will set sail in ventose, and arrive in germinal before Boulogne—­that is rather late.  In any case the Egyptian Expedition will cover the departure of the Toulon squadron:  everything will be managed so that Nelson will first sail for Alexandria.”