Besides, he had already met with one repulse from Napoleon.  He had offered, first to the Directory and later to the First Consul, a boat which he claimed would “deliver France and the world from British oppression.”

This was a sailing vessel, which could sink under water and then discharge under a hostile ship a “carcass” of gunpowder or torpedo—­another invention of his fertile brain.  The Directory at once repulsed him.  Bonaparte instructed Monge, Laplace, and Volney to report on this submarine or “plunging” boat, which had a partial success.  It succeeded in blowing up a small vessel in the harbour at Brest in July, 1801; but the Commission seems to have reported unfavourably on its utility for offensive purposes.  In truth, as Fulton had not then applied motive power to this invention, the name “plunging boat” conveyed an exaggerated notion of its functions, which were more suited to a life of ascetic contemplation than of destructive activity.

It appears that the memoir-writers named above have confused the two distinct inventions of Fulton just referred to.  In the latter half of 1803 he repaired to England, and later on to the United States, and after the year 1803 he seems to have had neither the will nor the opportunity to serve Napoleon.  In England he offered his torpedo patent to the English Admiralty, expressing his hatred of the French Emperor as a “wild beast who ought to be hunted down.”  Little was done with the torpedo in England, except to blow up a vessel off Walmer as a proof of what it could do.  It is curious also that when Bell offered his paddle-boat to the Admiralty it was refused, though Nelson is said to have spoken in its favour.  The official mind is everywhere hostile to new inventions; and Marmont suggestively remarks that Bonaparte’s training as an artillerist, and his experience of the inconvenience and expense resulting from the adoption of changes in that arm, had no slight influence in setting him against all innovations.

But, to resume our description of the Boulogne flotilla, it may be of interest to give some hitherto unpublished details about the flat-bottomed boats, and then to pass in brief review Napoleon’s plans for assuring a temporary command of the Channel.

It is clear that he at first relied almost solely on the flotilla.  After one of his visits to Boulogne, he wrote on November 23rd, 1803, to Admiral Gantheaume that he would soon have on the northern coast 1,300 flat-bottomed boats able to carry 100,000 men, while the Dutch flotilla would transport 60,000.  “Do you think it will take us to the English coast?  Eight hours of darkness which favour us would decide the fate of the universe.”  There is no mention of any convoying fleet:  the First Consul evidently believed that the flotilla could beat off any attack at sea.  This letter offers a signal proof of his inability, at least at that time, to understand the risks of naval warfare.  But though his precise