That there was every prospect of this last event was the conviction not only of the politicians at Washington, but also of every iron-worker on the Ohio and of every planter on the Tennessee.  Those young but growing settlements chafed against the restraints imposed by Spain on the river trade of the lower Mississippi—­the sole means available for their exports in times when the Alleghanies were crossed by only two tracks worthy the name of roads.  In 1795 they gained free egress to the Gulf of Mexico and the right of bonding their merchandise in a special warehouse at New Orleans.  Thereafter the United States calmly awaited the time when racial vigour and the exigencies of commerce should yield to them the possession of the western prairies and the little townships of Arkansas and New Orleans.  They reckoned without taking count of the eager longing of the French for their former colony and the determination of Napoleon to give effect to this honourable sentiment.

In July, 1800, when his negotiations with the United

States were in good train, the First Consul sent to Madrid instructions empowering the French Minister there to arrange a treaty whereby France should receive Louisiana in return for the cession of Tuscany to the heir of the Duke of Parma.  This young man had married the daughter of Charles IV. of Spain; and, for the aggrandizement of his son-in-law, that roi faineant, was ready, nay eager, to bargain away a quarter of a continent; and he did so by a secret convention signed at St. Ildefonso on October 7th, 1800.

But though Charles rejoiced over this exchange, Godoy, who was gifted with some insight into the future, was determined to frustrate it.  Various events occurred which enabled this wily Minister, first to delay, and then almost to prevent, the odious surrender.  Chief among these was the certainty that the transfer from weak hands to strong hands would be passionately resented by the United States; and until peace with England was fully assured, and the power of Toussaint broken, it would be folly for the First Consul to risk a conflict with the United States.  That they would fight rather than see the western prairies pass into the First Consul’s hands was abundantly manifest.  It is proved by many patriotic pamphlets.  The most important of these—­“An Address to the Government of the United States on the Cession of Louisiana to the French,” published at Philadelphia in 1802—­quoted largely from a French brochure by a French Councillor of State.  The French writer had stated that along the Mississippi his countrymen would find boundless fertile prairies, and as for the opposition of the United States—­“a nation of pedlars and shopkeepers”—­that could be crushed by a French alliance with the Indian tribes.  The American writer thereupon passionately called on his fellow-citizens to prevent this transfer:  “France is to be dreaded only, or chiefly, on the Mississippi.  The Government must take Louisiana before it passes into her hands.  The iron is now hot:  command us to rise as one man and strike.”  These and other like protests at last stirred the placid Government at Washington; and it bade the American Minister at Paris to make urgent remonstrances, the sole effect of which was to draw from Talleyrand the bland assurance that the transfer had not been seriously contemplated.[199]