That the news of the events at Lyons excited the liveliest indignation in London is evident from Hawkesbury’s despatch of February 12th, 1802, to Cornwallis: 

“The proceedings at Lyons have created the greatest alarm in this country, and there are many persons who were pacifically disposed, who since this event are desirous of renewing the war.  It is impossible to be surprised at this feeling when we consider the inordinate ambition, the gross breach of faith, and the inclination to insult Europe manifested by the First Consul on this occasion.  The Government here are desirous of avoiding to take notice of these proceedings, and are sincerely desirous to conclude the peace, if it can be obtained on terms consistent with our honour.”

Why the Government should have lagged behind the far surer instincts of English public opinion it is difficult to say.  Hawkesbury’s despatch of four days later supplies an excuse for his contemptible device of pretending not to see this glaring violation of the Treaty of Luneville.  Referring to the events at Lyons, he writes: 

“Extravagant and unjustifiable as they are in themselves, [they] must have led us to believe that the First Consul would have been more anxious than ever to have closed his account with this country.”

Doubtless that was the case, but only on condition that England remained passive while French domination was extended over all neighbouring lands.  If our Ministers believed that Bonaparte feared the displeasure of Austria, they were completely in error.  Thanks to the utter weakness of the European system, and the rivalry of Austria and Prussia, he was now able to concentrate his ever-increasing power and prestige on the negotiations at Amiens, which once more claim our attention.

Far from being sated by the prestige gained at Lyons, he seemed to grow more exacting with victory.  Moreover, he had been cut to the quick by some foolish articles of a French emigre named Peltier, in a paper published at London:  instead of treating them with the contempt they deserved, he magnified these ravings of a disappointed exile into an event of high policy, and fulminated against the Government which allowed them.  In vain did Cornwallis object that the Addington Cabinet could not venture on the unpopular act of curbing freedom of the Press in Great Britain.  The First Consul, who had experienced no such difficulty in France, persisted now, as a year later, in considering every uncomplimentary reference to himself as an indirect and semiofficial attack.