The recent admission of State bankruptcy at Paris, when two-thirds of the existing liabilities were practically expunged, sharpened the desire of the Directory to compass England’s ruin, an enterprise which might serve to restore French credit and would certainly engage those vehement activities of Bonaparte that could otherwise work mischief in Paris.  On his side he gladly accepted the command of the Army of England.

“The people of Paris do not remember anything,” he said to Bourrienne.  “Were I to remain here long, doing nothing, I should be lost.  In this great Babylon everything wears out:  my glory has already disappeared.  This little Europe does not supply enough of it for me.  I must seek it in the East:  all great fame comes from that quarter.  However, I wish first to make a tour along the [northern] coast to see for myself what may be attempted.  If the success of a descent upon England appear doubtful, as I suspect it will, the Army of England shall become the Army of the East, and I go to Egypt."[92]

In February, 1798, he paid a brief visit to Dunkirk and the Flemish coast, and concluded that the invasion of England was altogether too complicated to be hazarded except as a last desperate venture.  In a report to the Government (February 23rd) he thus sums up the whole situation: 

“Whatever efforts we make, we shall not for some years gain the naval supremacy.  To invade England without that supremacy is the most daring and difficult task ever undertaken....  If, having regard to the present organization of our navy, it seems impossible to gain the necessary promptness of execution, then we must really give up the expedition against England, be satisfied with keeping up the pretence of it, and concentrate all our attention and resources on the Rhine, in order to try to deprive England of Hanover and Hamburg:[93] ... or else undertake an eastern expedition which would menace her trade with the Indies.  And if none of these three operations is practicable, I see nothing else for it but to conclude peace with England.”

The greater part of his career serves as a commentary on these designs.  To one or other of them he was constantly turning as alternative schemes for the subjugation of his most redoubtable foe.  The first plan he now judged to be impracticable; the second, which appears later in its fully matured form as his Continental System, was not for the present feasible, because France was about to settle German affairs at the Congress of Rastadt; to the third he therefore turned the whole force of his genius.