Lord Raymond, 1301.  The Queen versus Tooley et al.  Lord Chief-Justice Holt says:  “The prisoner (i.e.  Tooley) in this had sufficient provocation; for if one be impressed upon an unlawful authority, it is a sufficient provocation to all people out of compassion; and where the liberty of the subject is invaded, it is a provocation to all the subjects of England, etc.; and surely a man ought to be concerned for Magna Charta and the laws:  and if any one, against the law, imprisons a man, he is an offender against Magna Charta.”

I am not insensible to Sir Michael Foster’s observations on these cases, but apprehend they do not invalidate the authority of them as far as I now apply them to the purposes of my argument.  If a stranger, a mere fellow-subject, may interpose to defend the liberty, he may, too, defend the life of another individual.  But, according to the evidence, some imprudent people, before the sentry, proposed to take him off his post; others threatened his life; and intelligence of this was carried to the main guard before any of the prisoners turned out.  They were then ordered out to relieve the sentry; and any of our fellow-citizens might lawfully have gone upon the same errand.  They were, therefore, a lawful assembly.

I have but one point of law more to consider, and that is this:  In the case before you I do not pretend to prove that every one of the unhappy persons slain was concerned in the riot.  The authorities read to you just now say it would be endless to prove whether every person that was present and in a riot was concerned in planning the first enterprise or not.  Nay, I believe it but justice to say some were perfectly innocent of the occasion.  I have reason to suppose that one of them was—­Mr. Maverick.  He was a very worthy young man, as he has been represented to me, and had no concern in the rioters’ proceedings of that night; and I believe the same may be said in favor of one more at least, Mr. Caldwell, who was slain; and, therefore, many people may think that as he and perhaps another was innocent, therefore innocent blood having been shed, that must be expiated by the death of somebody or other.  I take notice of this, because one gentleman was nominated by the sheriff for a juryman upon this trial, because he had said he believed Captain Preston was innocent, but innocent blood had been shed, and therefore somebody ought to be hanged for it, which he thought was indirectly giving his opinion in this cause.  I am afraid many other persons have formed such an opinion.  I do not take it to be a rule, that where innocent blood is shed the person must die.  In the instance of the Frenchmen on the Plains of Abraham, they were innocent, fighting for their king and country; their blood is as innocent as any.  There may be multitudes killed, when innocent blood is shed on all sides; so that it is not an invariable rule.  I will put a case in which, I dare say, all will agree with me.  Here