The government of this country is considerably carried on by the aid of royal commissions.  So great is the increase of public business that it would be probably impossible for a minister to carry on affairs without this assistance.  The Queen of England can command for these objects the services of the most experienced statesmen, and men of the highest position in society.  If necessary, she can summon to them distinguished scholars or men most celebrated in science and in arts; and she receives from them services that are unpaid.  They are only too proud to be described in the commission as her Majesty’s “trusty councilors”; and if any member of these commissions performs some transcendent services, both of thought and of labor, he is munificently rewarded by a public distinction conferred upon him by the fountain of honor.  Gentlemen, the government of the United States, has, I believe, not less availed itself of the services of commissions than the government of the United Kingdom; but in a country where there is no fountain of honor, every member of these commissions is paid.

Gentlemen, I trust I have now made some suggestions to you respecting the monarchy of England which at least may be so far serviceable that when we are separated they may not be altogether without advantage; and now, gentlemen, I would say something on the subject of the House of Lords.  It is not merely the authority of the throne that is now disputed, but the character and the influence of the House of Lords that are held up by some to public disregard.  Gentlemen, I shall not stop for a moment to offer you any proofs of the advantage of a second chamber; and for this reason.  That subject has been discussed now for a century, ever since the establishment of the government of the United States, and all great authorities, American, German, French, Italian, have agreed in this, that a representative government is impossible without a second chamber.  And it has been, especially of late, maintained by great political writers in all countries, that the repeated failure of what is called the French republic is mainly to be ascribed to its not having a second chamber.

But, gentlemen, however anxious foreign countries have been to enjoy this advantage, that anxiety has only been equaled by the difficulty which they have found in fulfilling their object.  How is a second chamber to be constituted?  By nominees of the sovereign power?  What influence can be exercised by a chamber of nominees?  Are they to be bound by popular election?  In what manner are they to be elected?  If by the same constituency as the popular body, what claim have they, under such circumstances, to criticize or to control the decisions of that body?  If they are to be elected by a more select body, qualified by a higher franchise, there immediately occurs the objection, why should the majority be governed by the minority?  The United States of America were fortunate in finding