round which all classes and parties could rally, representing the majesty of the law, the administration of justice, and involving, at the same time, the security for every man’s rights and the fountain of honor.  Now, gentlemen, it is well clearly to comprehend what is meant by a country not having a revolution for two centuries.  It means, for that space, the unbroken exercise and enjoyment of the ingenuity of man.  It means for that space the continuous application of the discoveries of science to his comfort and convenience.  It means the accumulation of capital, the elevation of labor, the establishment of those admirable factories which cover your district; the unwearied improvement of the cultivation of the land, which has extracted from a somewhat churlish soil harvests more exuberant than those furnished by lands nearer to the sun.  It means the continuous order which is the only parent of personal liberty and political right.  And you owe all these, gentlemen, to the throne.

There is another powerful and most beneficial influence which is also exercised by the crown.  Gentlemen, I am a party man.  I believe that, without party, parliamentary government is impossible.  I look upon parliamentary government as the noblest government in the world, and certainly the one most suited to England.  But without the discipline of political connection, animated by the principle of private honor, I feel certain that a popular assembly would sink before the power or the corruption of a minister.  Yet, gentlemen, I am not blind to the faults of party government.  It has one great defect.  Party has a tendency to warp the intelligence, and there is no minister, however resolved he may be in treating a great public question, who does not find some difficulty in emancipating himself from the traditionary prejudice on which he has long acted.  It is, therefore, a great merit in our constitution, that before a minister introduces a measure to Parliament, he must submit it to an intelligence superior to all party, and entirely free from influences of that character.

I know it will be said, gentlemen, that, however beautiful in theory, the personal influence of the sovereign is now absorbed in the responsibility of the minister.  Gentlemen, I think you will find there is great fallacy in this view.  The principles of the English constitution do not contemplate the absence of personal influence on the part of the sovereign; and if they did, the principles of human nature would prevent the fulfillment of such a theory.  Gentlemen, I need not tell you that I am now making on this subject abstract observations of general application to our institutions and our history.  But take the case of a sovereign of England, who accedes to his throne at the earliest age the law permits, and who enjoys a long reign,—­take an instance like that of George III.  From the earliest moment of his accession that sovereign is placed in constant communication