I go further, Mr. Chairman, and take a stronger ground.  I say, in the nature of things, the dependence of the judges upon the legislature, and their right to declare the acts of the legislature void, are repugnant, and cannot exist together.  The doctrine, sir, supposes two rights—­first, the right of the legislature to destroy the office of the judge, and the right of the judge to vacate the act of the legislature.  You have a right to abolish by a law the offices of the judges of the circuit courts; they have a right to declare the law void.  It unavoidably follows, in the exercise of these rights, either that you destroy their rights, or that they destroy yours.  This doctrine is not a harmless absurdity, it is a most dangerous heresy.  It is a doctrine which cannot be practiced without producing not discord only, but bloodshed.  If you pass the bill upon your table, the judges have a constitutional right to declare it void.  I hope they will have courage to exercise that right; and if, sir, I am called upon to take my side, standing acquitted in ray conscience, and before my God, of all motives but the support of the constitution of my country, I shall not tremble at the consequences.

The constitution may have its enemies, but I know that it has also its friends.  I beg gentlemen to pause, before they take this rash step.  There are many, very many, who believe, if you strike this blow, you inflict a mortal wound on the constitution.  There are many now willing to spill their blood to defend that constitution.  Are gentlemen disposed to risk the consequences?  Sir, I mean no threats, I have no expectation of appalling the stout hearts of my adversaries; but if gentlemen are regardless of themselves, let them consider their wives and children, their neighbors and their friends.  Will they risk civil dissension, will they hazard the welfare, will they jeopardize the peace of the country, to save a paltry sum of money, less than thirty thousand dollars?

Mr. Chairman, I am confident that the friends of this measure are not apprised of the nature of its operation, nor sensible of the mischievous consequences which are likely to attend it.  Sir, the morals of your people, the peace of the country, the stability of the government, rest upon the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary.  It is not of half the importance in England, that the judges should be independent of the crown, as it is with us that they should be independent of the legislature.  Am I asked, would you render the judges superior to the legislature?  I answer, no, but co-ordinate.  Would you render them independent of the legislature?  I answer, yes, independent of every power on earth, while they behave themselves well.  The essential interests, the permanent welfare of society, require this independence; not, sir, on account of the judge; that is a small consideration, but on account of those between whom he is to decide.  You calculate on the weaknesses of human nature, and you suffer the judge to be dependent on no one, lest he should be partial to those on whom he depends.  Justice does not exist where partiality prevails.  A dependent judge cannot be impartial.  Independence is, therefore, essential to the purity of your judicial tribunals.