the court are bound by the law, and obliged to pronounce upon them the sentence which it inflicts.  Deny to the courts of the United States the power of judging upon the constitutionality of our laws, and it is vain to talk of its existing elsewhere.  The infractors of the laws are brought before these courts, and if the courts are implicitly bound, the invalidity of the laws can be no defense.  There is, however, Mr. Chairman, still a stronger ground of argument upon this subject.  I shall select one or two cases to illustrate it.  Congress are prohibited from passing a bill of attainder; it is also declared in the constitution, that “no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture, except during the life of the party attainted.”  Let us suppose that Congress pass a bill of attainder, or they enact, that any one attainted of treason shall forfeit, to the use of the United States, all the estate which he held in any lands or tenements.

The party attainted is seized and brought before a federal court, and an award of execution passed against him.  He opens the constitution and points to this line, “no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.”  The attorney for the United States reads the bill of attainder.

The courts are bound to decide, but they have only the alternative of pronouncing the law or the constitution invalid.  It is left to them only to say that the law vacates the constitution, or the constitution voids the law.  So, in the other case stated, the heir after the death of his ancestor, brings his ejectment in one of the courts of the United States to recover his inheritance.  The law by which it is confiscated is shown.  The constitution gave no power to pass such a law.  On the contrary, it expressly denied it to the government.  The title of the heir is rested on the constitution, the title of the government on the law.  The effect of one destroys the effect of the other; the court must determine which is effectual.

There are many other cases, Mr. Chairman, of a similar nature to which I might allude.  There is the case of the privilege of habeas corpus, which cannot be suspended but in times of rebellion or invasion.  Suppose a law prohibiting the issue of the writ at a moment of profound peace!  If, in such case, the writ were demanded of a court, could they say, it is true the legislature were restrained from passing the law suspending the privilege of this writ, at such a time as that which now exists, but their mighty power has broken the bonds of the constitution, and fettered the authority of the court?  I am not, sir, disposed to vaunt, but standing on this ground, I throw the gauntlet to any champion upon the other side.  I call upon them to maintain, that, in a collision between a law and the constitution, the judges are bound to support the law, and annul the constitution.  Can the gentlemen relieve themselves from this dilemma?  Will they say, though a judge has no power to pronounce a law void, he has a power to declare the constitution invalid?