Whoever, indeed, pronounceth concerning his neighbor’s intentions otherwise than as they are evidently expressed by words, or signified by overt actions, is a slanderer; because he pretendeth to know, and dareth to aver, that which he nowise possibly can tell whether it be true; because the heart is exempt from all jurisdiction here, is only subject to the government and trial of another world; because no man can judge concerning the truth of such accusations, because no man can exempt or defend himself from them: so that apparently such practice doth thwart all course of justice and equity.
4. Another kind is, perverting a man’s words or actions disadvantageously by affected misconstruction. All words are ambiguous, and capable of different senses, some fair, some more foul; all actions have two handles, one that candor and charity will, another that disingenuity and spite may lay hold on; and in such cases to misapprehend is a calumnious procedure, arguing malignant disposition and mischievous design. Thus, when two men did witness that our Lord affirmed, he “could demolish the Temple, and rear it again in three days”—although he did, indeed, speak words to that purpose, meaning them in a figurative sense, discernible enough to those who would candidly have minded his drift and way of speaking:—yet they who crudely alleged them against him are called false witnesses. “At last,” saith the Gospel, “came two false witnesses, and said, This fellow said, I am able to destroy the temple,” etc. Thus, also, when some certified of St Stephen, as having said that “Jesus of Nazareth should destroy that place, and change the customs that Moses delivered”; although probably he did speak words near to that purpose, yet are those men called false witnesses. “And,” saith St. Luke, “they set up false witnesses, which said, This man ceaseth not to speak blasphemous words,” etc. Which instances do plainly show, if we would avoid the guilt of slander, how careful we should be to interpret fairly and favorably the words and actions of our neighbor.
5. Another sort of this practice is, partial and lame representation of men’s discourse, or their practice, suppressing some part of the truth in them, or concealing some circumstances about them which might serve to explain, to excuse, or to extenuate them. In such a manner easily, without uttering; any logical untruth, one may yet grievously calumniate. Thus, suppose a man speaketh a thing upon supposition,