boundaries, and, in fine, to every international subject whatsoever.  This exposition is supported by such unequivocal authority, that it is believed it will not be questioned.  I, therefore, infer that it will be readily yielded, that in regard to the treaty, in aid of which this bill is exhibited, the treaty-making power has not exceeded its just limits.  So far we have proceeded on sure ground; we now come to the pith of the question.  Is the legislative sanction necessary to give it effect?  I answer in the negative.  Why?  Because, by the second clause of the sixth article of the constitution, it is declared that all treaties made or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.  If this clause means anything, it is conclusive of the question.

If the treaty be a supreme law, then whatsoever municipal regulation comes within its provisions must ipso facto be annulled—­unless gentlemen contend there can be at the same time two supreme laws, emanating from the same authority, conflicting with each other, and still both in full vigor and effect.  This would indeed produce a state of things without a parallel in human affairs, unless indeed its like might be found in the history of the Popes.  In one instance, we are told, there were three at one time roaming over the Christian world, all claiming infallibility, and denouncing their anathemas against all who failed to yield implicit obedience to their respective mandates, when to comply with the one was to disobey the other.  A result like this, so monstrous in its aspect, excludes the interpretation which produces it.  It is a safe course in attempting to ascertain the meaning of a law or constitution to connect different clauses (no matter how detached) upon the same subject together.  Let us do it in this case.  The President shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, which treaties shall be the supreme law of the land.  I seek to gain no surreptitious advantage from the word supreme, because I frankly admit that it is used in the Constitution, in relation to the laws and constitutions of the States; but I appeal to it merely to ascertain the high authority intended to be imparted by the framers of the constitution to a ratified treaty.  It is classed in point of dignity with the laws of the United States.  We ask for no superiority, but equality; and as the last law made annuls a former one, where they conflict, so we contend that a subsequent treaty, as in the present case, revokes a former law in opposition thereto.  But the other side contend that it is inferior to the law in point of authority, which continues in full force despite of a treaty, and to its repeal the assent of the whole legislature is necessary.  Our claims rest on the expressed words of the constitution—­the opposite on implication; and if the latter be just, I cannot forbear to say that the framers of the constitution