All facts connecting Lloyd with the case tend to his implication and guilt, and to prove that he adopted the dernier ressort of guilt—­ accusation and inculpation of another.  In case Lloyd were innocent and Mrs. Surratt the guilty coadjutrix and messenger of the conspirators, would not Lloyd have been able to cite so many open and significant remarks and acts of Mrs. Surratt that he would not have been obliged to recall, in all perversion and weakness of uncertainty, deeds and speech so common and unmeaning as his testimony includes?

It is upon these considerations that we feel ourselves safe and reasonable in the position that there are facts and circumstances, both external and internal, connected with the testimony of Weichmann and Lloyd, which, if they do not destroy, do certainly greatly shake their credibility, and which, under the rule that will give Mrs. Surratt the benefit of all reasonable doubts, seem to forbid that she should be convicted upon the unsupported evidence of these two witnesses.  But even admitting the facts to be proven as above recited, it remains to be seen where is the guilty knowledge of the contemplated assassination; and this brings us to the inquiry whether these facts are not explainable so as to exclude guilt.

From one of the most respected of legal authorities the following is taken:—­

“Whenever, therefore, the evidence leaves it indifferent which of several hypotheses is true, or merely establishes some finite probability in favor of one hypothesis rather than another, such evidence cannot amount to proof.  The maxim of the law is that it is better that ninety-nine offenders should escape than that one innocent man should be condemned.” (Starkie on Evidence.)

The acts of Mrs. Surratt must have been accompanied with criminal intent in order to make them criminal.  If any one supposes that any such intent existed, the supposition comes alone from inference.  If disloyal acts and constant disloyal practices, if overt and open action against the government, on her part, had been shown down to the day of the murder of the President, it would do something toward establishing the inference of criminal intent.  On the other hand, just the reverse is shown.  The remarks here of the learned and honorable judge advocate are peculiarly appropriate to this branch of the discussion, and, with his authority, we waive all others.

“If the court please, I will make a single remark.  I think the testimony in this case has proved, what I believe history sufficiently attests, how kindred to each other are the crimes of treason against a nation and the assassination of its chief magistrate.  As I think of those crimes, the one seems to be, if not the necessary consequence, certainly a logical sequence from the other.  The murder of the President of the United States, as alleged and shown, was preeminently a political assassination.  Disloyalty to the