LXVI.  The partisans of Pompeius being greatly elated at this success were eager to have a decisive battle.  Pompeius wrote to the distant kings and generals and cities to inform them that he was victorious, but he feared the risk of a battle, thinking that by delay and reducing the enemy to straits he should finally vanquish men who were invincible in arms and had long been accustomed to conquer together, but as to the other military duties, and marches, and change of position, and digging of trenches and building of walls, were not efficient by reason of age and on this account were eager to come to close fighting and to engage hand to hand.  However, previous to the last contest Pompeius had been able in some degree to draw his men from their purpose by persuading them to keep quiet; but when Caesar after the battle was compelled by want of provisions to break up his camp, and began his march into Thessaly through the country of the Athamanes,[361] the confidence of the soldiers of Pompeius could no longer be kept in check, and calling out that Caesar was flying, some were for following and pursuing him, and others for crossing over into Italy, and others were sending to Rome their slaves and friends to get possession of houses near the Forum, with the intention of forthwith becoming candidates for office.  Many of their own accord sailed to Cornelia who was in Lesbos bearing the good tidings of the war being at an end; for Pompeius had sent her there out of the way of danger.  The Senate being assembled, Afranius gave his opinion that they should stick to Italy, for Italy was the chief prize of the war, and would bring to those who were masters of it the possession of Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Iberia, and all Gaul; and as to that which was the greatest concern to Pompeius, his native country who was stretching out her hands only at a short distance from them, it was not honourable to leave her to be insulted and enslaved by slaves and flatterers of tyrants.  But Pompeius did not consider it to be consistent with his reputation to run away from Caesar a second time and to be pursued, when fortune gave him the opportunity of being the pursuer, nor did he think it consistent with his duty to desert Scipio[362] and the consular men in Hellas and Thessaly who would immediately fall into Caesar’s hands with their military chests and large forces; he thought also that Rome was best cared for by fighting in her defence as far from her as possible, that she might wait for the conqueror without feeling or hearing of any misfortunes.

LXVII.  Having come to this decision, Pompeius pursued Caesar, resolved to avoid a battle, but by following close up to hem him in and wear him out by privation.  He had other reasons for thinking this to be the best plan, and it also reached his ears that it was a subject of common conversation among the cavalry that they ought to defeat Caesar as soon as they could and then put down Pompeius also.  Some say that this was also the reason why Pompeius