A government’s generous care for widows deprived of a husband’s support and companionship by the casualties or disabilities of war rests upon grounds which all must cheerfully approve; but it is difficult to place upon these grounds the case of this proposed beneficiary, who has renounced a wife’s relation, with all its duties and all its rights, and who by her own act placed herself beyond the possibility of becoming the widow of her soldier husband.

If, as stated in the report of the House committee on this bill, the beneficiary for some reason contributed something toward the soldier’s support after her divorce and paid the expense of his burial, the fact still remains that this soldier died in a soldiers’ home wifeless and leaving no one surviving who, claiming to be his widow, should be allowed to profit by his death.

GROVER CLEVELAND.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, May 21, 1896.

To the House of Representatives: 

I herewith return without approval House bill No. 1185, entitled “An act granting a pension to Rachel Patton.”

John H. Patton, the husband of the beneficiary, was a captain in an
Illinois regiment, and was killed in action June 25, 1863.

In December, 1863, the beneficiary was pensioned as his widow at the rate of $20 a month.

She received this pension for thirteen years and until 1876, when she married one William G. Culbertson.  Thereupon, because of such marriage, her name was dropped from the pension rolls, pursuant to law.

In 1889, thirteen years after her remarriage and the termination of her pension, she procured a decree of divorce against her second husband on the ground of desertion.

She has a small income, but it does not appear that alimony was allowed her in the divorce proceedings.

It is proposed by this bill to pension her at the same rate which was allowed her while she remained the widow of the deceased soldier.

It can not be denied that the remarriage of this beneficiary terminated her pensionable relation to the Government as completely as if it never existed.  The statute which so provides simply declares what is approved by a fair and sensible consideration of pension principles.  As a legal proposition, the pensionable status of a soldier’s widow, lost by her remarriage, can not be recovered by the dissolution of the second marriage.  Waiving, however, the application of strictly legal principles to the subject, there does not appear to be any sentiment which should restore to the pension rolls as the widow of a deceased soldier a divorced wife who has relinquished the title of soldier’s widow to again become a wife, and who to secure the expected advantages and comforts of a second marriage has been quite willing to forego the provision which was made for her by the Government solely on the grounds of her soldier widowhood.

GROVER CLEVELAND.