Controversies are apt to be acrimonious.  You, Sir, have certainly shewn instances to the contrary.  You have charity beyond your fellows in the ecclesiastical line, and your answerers seem not to me to have a right in fair argument to step out of the limits you have prescribed yourself.  To dispute with you is a pleasure equal almost to that of agreeing with another person.  You have candour enough to allow it possible that an atheist may be a moral man.  Where is that other ecclesiastic who will allow the same?  Your answerers ought also to hold themselves precluded from using ridicule in handling this subject.  I am no great supporter of Lord Shaftesbury’s doctrine that ridicule is the test of truth.  I own truth can never be ridiculous, that is, it can never be worthy of laughter, but still it may be laughed at.  To use the other term, I may say, truth can never be worthy of ridicule, but still it may be ridiculed.  Just ridicule is a sufficient test of truth; but after all we should be driven to an inquiry, upon the principles of reasoning, whether the ridicule were just or not.  Boldness, which is not incompatible with decency and candour, I do hold to be an absolute requisite in all speech and argument, where truth is the object of inquiry.  Therefore when I am asked, whether there is a God or no God, I do not mince the matter, but I boldly answer there is none, and give my reason for my disbelief; for I adopt my friend’s answer by the publication of it.

That mischief may ensue to society by such freedom of discussion is also another argument for me to consider; I do not say to combat, for though I were convinced or could not resist the argument that mischief would ensue to society by such a discussion, yet I should think myself intitled to enter into it.  I have a right to truth, and to publish truth, let society suffer or not suffer by it.  That society which suffers by truth should be otherwise constituted; and as I cannot well think that truth will hurt any society rightly constituted, so I should rather be inclined to doubt the force of the argument in case atheism being found to be truth should apparently be proved prejudicial to such a society.

I come unprejudiced to the question, and when I have promised you an answer to your future Letters in support of revelation, I have neither anticipated your argument nor prejudged the cause.  I hold myself open to be convinced, and if I am convinced I shall say so, which is equally answering as if I denied the force of your observations.  In that sense only I promise an answer.  If I believe I shall say, I do; but I shall not believe and tremble, confident as I am, that if I act an honest part in life, whether there be a Deity and a future existence or not, whatever reason I may have to rejoice in case such ideas he realised, I can upon such an issue have none to tremble.  I look upon myself to have more reason to be temporally afraid than eternally so.  Dr. Priestley or any