A gratis assertion is first made, that all things we see are effects; then because we see one thing caused, every thing must have been caused.  His conclusion of the argument is still more curious, “because every thing was caused there must have been something that was not caused.”  The cause ought to be proportioned to the effect.  The effect is not infinite.  Why then attribute infinity to the cause?  This is Hume’s argument.  Priestley calls it shortly unworthy of a philosopher.  Let others judge!  But surely, with all this infinity it may be asked, why may not there have been an infinity of causes?

Another argument is, that being unable to account, for what is, by any thing visible, we must have recourse to something invisible, and that invisible power is what he calls God.  Apply this argument to gravity, and the external force that is said to cause every stone to fall is God.  But if nothing visible can to us account for the operations of nature, why must we have recourse to what is invisible?  Why necessary to account at all for them?  Or why may not visible things account for them, although this person or another cannot tell which?

If nothing can begin to exist of itself or by the energy of material nature, it is more consistent to allow a plurality of Deities, than one immediate Deity.  An equality in a plurality of Deities might be objectionable.  But that is not at all necessary, rather the contrary; and so was the Pagan theory, which is not so absurd as the modern one.  This universe or mundane system may be the work of one hand, another of another, and so on.  Where is the absurdity of that?  If the universe is applied to the solar system, there is an appearance of its being formed by one design, and in that stile it might be said to be the work of one hand.  But this Deity is asserted to be infinite, and to have made all other worlds and universes, though it does not appear by any unity of design that all other worlds and universes are one work with this.

Dr. Priestley himself allows that reason would drive us to require a cause of the Deity.  He is himself obliged to conclude, after all his reasoning, that we must acquiesce in our inability of having any idea on the subject; that is, how God could exist without a prior cause.  At the same time he says the Deity cannot have a cause, and therefore we cannot reason about him.  Why then all his own reasoning?  We make a Deity ourselves, fall down and worship him.  It is the molten calf over again.  Idolatry is still practised.  The only difference is that now we worship idols of our imagination; before of our hands.  “Still we must necessarily rest at a Being that is infinite;” that is, when our reason drives us to the admission of an infinite cause we must necessarily stop finitely in our career.  Not content with this conclusion he adds, that we cannot help perceiving the existence of this cause, though he owns that it is not an object of our conceptions.  But even the Theist’s argument does not necessarily drive us to the admission of an infinite cause.  The argument is, “because there is a man, and man has intelligence, we must necessarily admit of a Being of infinitely superior intelligence.”  Would it not be nearly as well to argue, “because there is a goose, therefore there must be a man.”