conclude he mist of his design, that is, he wanted power or knowledge, than that he wanted benevolence.  If he means to argue that it is more rational to conclude this Deity wanted power and knowledge than that he wanted benevolence, and because Dr. Priestley fancies himself to have proved the Deity cannot want the two former, he concludes the Deity cannot want the latter, as the less probable for him to be deficient in, his argument is no more a truism.  As a wish, that the Deity may not want benevolence, in that sense let him take it as agreed upon.  He allows that misery in the human species proves malevolence in the Deity, and happiness the contrary.  All the proof adduced in favour of benevolence is in asserting that throughout the universe, good is more predominant than evil.  The infinite extent of benevolence he will allow incapable of proof; but then it is said that the evils which mankind endure are not so great as might be inflicted upon them; that virtue to vice, happiness to misery, health to sickness bear at least equal proportions.  That lesser evils exist instead of greater is indeed but a poor proof in the favour of the benevolence of an all-powerful Being.  Or grant, that good is more predominant than evil, this surely is no proof neither of the benevolence of a kind and all-powerful Being.  Yet Dr. Priestley adds that the general benevolence of the Deity is unquestionable.  How unquestionable?  It is questioned by the author himself, and he declares he cannot prove it.  After this he asks, who will pretend to dictate to such a Being?  He might in the same stile conclude that no objection deserved a reply.  The whole of this is absurd; but when the Doctor begins to feel enthusiasm he is like the rest of the ecclesiastical arguers.  They reason themselves into imaginary Beings with more imaginary properties and then fall down and worship them.  God is said to have made man in the image of himself.  If he has done so, man is up with him, for he in return makes God in his own image.  Much as the imagination of one man differs from another, so differs the God of each devotee.  They are all idolaters or anthropomorphites to a man; there is none but an atheist that is not the one or the other.

The admission of evil into the world is an argument so exceedingly conclusive against at least a good Deity, that it is curious to see how Dr. Priestley studies to get rid of that difficulty.  He partly denies the fact, at least he says there is more good than evil in the world.  At last he even turns evil into good, or what ought to be the effects of one, into what ought to be the effects of the other, as he says pain is necessary for happiness.  But if pain is, as he says, in this world necessary for happiness, why will it not still be necessary hereafter?  He answers, because by that time we shall have experienced pain enough for a future supply of happiness.  If it is objected, why have we not had pain enough by the time each of us are twenty or thirty years of