My colleague has proved that whatever the form of government, there must be a body capable of wise legislation, in fact, that there must be a body that is primarily legislative in character no matter what its connection or relation with the other departments of government. That a small commission, burdened with administrative and judicial functions, is not a proper legislative body is at once apparent. My colleague has demonstrated that this confusion of powers must result in inefficiency. But further than this, it is our contention that a body such as is the commission, without respect to the confusion of powers, without regard to the administrative duties weighing upon it, that this commission, of itself, is not suited to legislation.
There is no more reason for placing the legislation of the city of Chicago in the hands of five men than that the state legislature of Minnesota should be reduced to five members. It is true that, in many respects, the legislation of a city differs from that of a state, but it is, nevertheless, legislation, and in the larger cities particularly it is necessary that there be a representative legislative body. Five men no more constitute a proper legislative body for 800,000 or a million people of a city than for that many people outside the city. It is contrary to the fundamental conception of a legislative body that it be composed of a few. In no country of free institutions is a legislative body so constituted. My colleague has proved, and it cannot be successfully controverted, that in the city, as well as in the state, there is a large field for legislation. Why, then, should there not be a legislative body to perform the work of legislation? Why place the work in the hands of a body that is primarily administrative in character?
This objection alone must
forever prevent the larger cities of the
United States from adopting
the commission plan. Or, if adopted, it
must, for this reason alone,
prove itself a failure.
Mr. Robbins replied for the Affirmative:
The Negative argue that the mechanisms of government in Boston may differ from those of San Francisco. This is not a discussion of the mechanisms of government. It involves deep and fundamental principles relative to a given form of city organization. The gentlemen have not, nor cannot, cite one iota of evidence that the underlying principles of organization in the governments of Boston and San Francisco should be different. The allusion to changing mechanisms is no excuse for their failure to set in operation a definite and positive form of organization. Yet the gentlemen have ingeniously endeavored to evade this duty. Why have they done so? Because every system of municipal organization based upon the separation of powers—for which the gentlemen are contending—has proved an admitted failure.
Do not the citizens of Brooklyn and